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Abstract — Franc¸ois Vie`te considered most of his mathematical treatises to be part
of a body of texts he entitled Opus restitutæ Mathematicæ Analyseos Seu Algebraˆ novaˆ.
Despite this title and the fact that the term “algebra” has often been used to designate
what is customarily regarded as Vie`te’s main contribution to mathematics, such a term is
not part of his vocabulary. How should we understand this term, in the context of the title
of his Opus, where “new algebra” is identified with “restored analysis”? To answer this
question, I suggest distinguishing between two kinds of problematic analysis: the former is
that described by Pappus at the beginning of the 7th book of his Mathematical Collection,
which I will call “intra-configurational”; the latter is the one Vie`te applied, which I will call
“trans-configurational”. In order to apply the latter kind of analysis, Vie`te relies on his new
formalism. I argue, however, that the use of this formalism is not a necessary condition for
applying it. I also argue that the same kind of analysis was largely applied before Vie`te for
solving geometrical problems, by relying on geometrical inferences of a special sort which I
call “non-positional”, since they do not depend on a diagram. As an example of a similar
systematic application of trans-configurational analysis, I consider al-Khayya¯m’s Treatise
of Algebra and Al-muqa¯bala. Finally, I suggest that Vie`te, when speaking of algebra in
the title of his Opus, refers to the system of techniques underlying trans-configurational
analysis, that is, to the art of transforming the conditions of certain purely quantitative
problems, using either an appropriate formalism relative to the operations of addition, sub-
traction, multiplication, division, root extraction and solving polynomial equations applied
to indeterminate numbers, or appropriate geometrical, non-positional inferences.
Re´sume´ — Franc¸ois Vie`te conside´rait la plupart de ses traite´s mathe´matiques comme
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des parties d’un corpus de textes auquel il donna le titre de Opus restitutæ Mathemat-
icæ Analyseos Seu Algebraˆ novaˆ. Malgre´ ce titre et le fait que le terme “alge`bre” ait e´te´
souvent employe´ pour designer celle qui est d’habitude conside´re´e comme la principale
contribution de Vie`te aux mathe´matiques, ce terme ne fait pas partie de son langage tech-
nique. Commentr doit-on l’entendre, dans le contexte du titre de son Opus, ou` la “nouvelle
alge`bre” est identifie´e a` l’ “analyse restaure´e”? Pour re´pondre a` cette question, je pro-
pose de distinguer deux sortes d’analyse proble´matique: la premie`re est celle de´crite par
Pappus au de´but du VIIe Livre de sa Collection mathe´matique et que je propose d’appeler
“intra-configurationnelle”; la seconde est celle qui est applique´e par Vie`te et que je propose
d’appeler “trans-configurationnelle”. Pour appliquer cette seconde sorte d’analyse, Vie`te se
re´clame de son nouveau formalisme. Je maintiens, cependant, que l’usage de ce formalisme
n’est pas ne´cessaire. Je maintiens aussi que cette sorte d’analyse e´tait souvent applique´e
avant Vie`te pour re´soudre des proble`mes ge´ome´triques, en se re´clamant d’un type parti-
culier d’infe´re´nces ge´ome´triques que j’appelle “non-positionnelles”, car elle ne de´pendent
d’aucun diagramme. Pour donner un exemple d’une telle application syste´matique de
l’analyse trans-configurationnelle, je me penche sur le Traite´ d’alge`bre et al-muqa¯bala d’al-
Khayya¯m. Je sugge`re enfin qu’en parlant d’alge`bre, dans le titre de son Opus, Vie`te se
re´fe´rait au syste`me de techniques sous-jacentes a` l’analyse trans-configurationnelle, c’est-
a`-dire a` l’art de transformer les conditions de certains proble`mes purement quantitatifs, en
utilisant soit un formalisme approprie´, concernant les ope´rations d’addition, soustraction,
multiplication, division, extraction de racines et solution d’e´quations entie`res applique´es
aux nombres, soit des infe´rences ge´ome´triques non-positionnelles.
Keywords — Algebra, Analysis, Vie`te, Al-Khayya¯m, Pappus.
Mathematics Subject Classification — 01A20/01A30/01A40/01A45
When he published the first edition of his In artem Analyticem Isagoge, in 1591, Franc¸ois
Vie`te presented it as the first of ten treatises that were to form a systematic body of math-
ematical texts entitled Opus restitutæ Mathematicæ Analyseos Seu Algebraˆ novaˆ1. Despite
the identification of “restored analysis” and “new algebra” suggested by this title, Vie`te’s
1Cf. [73], 1r-1v; Vie`te also provides a list of the treatises that were to form his Opus: cf. footnote (2).
Some copies of the same printed texts both of the dedicatory letter to the Princess Catherine de Parthenay
and of the Isagoge were bound together forming a volume entitled Opus: Francisci Vietæ Fontenæensis
Opus restitutæ mathematicæ analyseos seu algebra nova (and mentions the same publisher and date as
[73]). A copy of such a volume is now conserved at the Library of the Arsenal, in Paris, under the signature
“FOL- S- 1091 (2), Pie`ce n◦ 2”. Presumably Ritter was basing on this volume for his French translation of
the dedicatory letter to the Princess Catherine de Parthenay and of the Isagoge: cf. [65], pp. 224 (footnote
by B. Boncompagni) and 225.
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vocabulary in the Isagoge and other treatises of his Opus2 includes the term “analysis”,
but not the term “algebra”.
Still, Vie`te’s title was not inconsequent. In 1630, two different French translations of the
Isagoge and the Zeteticorum libri quinque (the second treatise of Vie`te’s Opus), appeared,
prepared by Vaule´zard and Vasset, respectively3. The former published his translations
separately, and entitled the first of them Introduction en l’art analytic, ou Nouvelle alge`bre;
the latter united his translations in a unique volume, under the title L’alge`bre nouvelle
de Mr Vie`te. Also in 1630 Ghetaldi’s posthumous treatise on Vie`te’s art was published.
Though, for Ghetaldi, this art pertained to analysis and synthesis (which, contrary to
Vie`te, he called with their Latin names: “resolutio” and “compositio”), it applied a sort of
“algebra”: “not the vulgar sort [. . . ], but that of which Franc¸ois Vie`te is the author”4.
When van Shooten published his edition of Vie`te’s Opera mathematica, sixteen years
later, in 1646, he did not follow the practice of Vaule´zard, Vasset and Ghetaldi: while he
included in his collection all the treatises included in Vie`te’s Opus (including Anderson’s5),
he did not mention this Opus as such, and attributed to Vie`te no sort of algebra. However,
he transformed Vie`te’s terminology, too and called him “the first author of analysis by
species [Analyseos Speciosæ]”, whereas Vie`te himself had used the term “logistic by species
[logistice speciosa]”.
The comparison of the wording of Vie`te, Vaule´zard, Vasset, Ghetaldi, and van Shooten
shows that the technical vocabulary of Vie`te’s school was unstable. In consequence, the
mutual relations that, according to Vie`te and his followers, should have held between
analysis, algebra and logistic, in particular when they were supposed to deal with species,
are quite difficult to clarify based on a literal examination of their works. As a matter of
fact, when we follow Ritter and claim that Vie`te was the “inventor of modern algebra”6, or
simply admit that he marked a turning point in the history of algebra, we are thus using
the term “algebra” in a sense that we are attributing to Vie`te, rather than drawing from
the examination of his works. And it is only based on this sense that we can describe
Vie`te’s (new) algebra.
Something similar happens, in general, when we speak of algebra with respect to early
2Vie`te’s Opus was to comprise ten treatises. Eight of them correspond with eight of his later pub-
lications: [80], [74], [77], the first part of [79], [83], [75], [76]. The remaining two are denoted as the Ad
Logisticem speciosam Notæ posteriores and the Analytica angularum sectionum in tres partes tributa. Ritter
[cf. [66], 396] has suggested that the former identifies with the second part of [79]. A. Anderson reconstructed
the first part of the latter in [78], while there is no trace of the two other parts.
3Cf. [71], [72], and [70].
4Cf. [31], 1-2: “Duplex autem est resolutionis genus alterum quidem ad Theoremata pertinet [. . . ]
alterum vero ad Problemata [. . . ]. sed omnia fere Theoremata, & Problemata, quæ sub Algebram cadunt
facillime resolvuntur, ac per resolutionis vestigia componuntur: non quidem vulgaris Algebræ beneficio; quæ
resolutionis vestigia omnino confundit; sed illius, cuius auctor est Franciscus Vieta [. . . ].”
5Cf. footnote (2).
6Cf. [65], 223 and [66].
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modern mathematics, or when we reconstruct a long-term evolution of algebra or compare
different stages in such an evolution. We often have no room to claim that we are simply
speaking of what the mathematicians we are considering were calling “algebra”. This is
not simply because, in such a way, we would hide the historical and mathematical reasons
which justify the terminological choices of these mathematicians or those which make our
account historically relevant. It is also, primarily, because a number of mathematicians we
speak about, or we would like to speak about for tracing a coherent historical interpretation
used the term “algebra” to denote something which they did not clearly feature, or did not
even speak of algebra at all, or spoke of it by referring to things that are quite different
from each other. When we deal with the history of algebra we are forced to interpret,
to advance implicit or explicit historiographical hypotheses; we cannot limit ourselves to
describe.
The aim of my paper is to advance just such an historiographical hypothesis. It con-
cerns algebra in the early modern age, and especially Vie`te’s algebra and its relation with
analysis (and geometry). The early modern age and Vie`te, however, will be only the termini
ad quem of my enquiry. My aim is to suggest a possible sense that we could attribute to
the term “algebra” in the context of the title which Vie`te gave to his Opus. I shall rely for
this on a distinction between two different sorts of analysis in pre-modern mathematics.
I suggest that when Vie`te was identified “new algebra” with “restored analysis”, he was
implicitly acknowledging that—within a mathematical tradition from which he felt him-
self to descend—the second sort of analysis had gone together with what he was terming
“algebra”, and he was referring to a new way to perform this sort of analysis for solving
a certain class of problems, namely a way based on the use of the formalism which the
Isagoge was aiming to introduce.
The following quotation—drawn from the dedicatory letter to the Princess Catherine
de Parthenay with which Vie`te prefaced the Isagoge—can be read as a (partial) textual
justification of my hypothesis; I will take it, in any case, as a guide for my enquiry7:
Ecce ars quam profero nova est, aut demum ita vetusta, & a barbaris defæ-
data & conspurcata, ut novam omnino formam ei inducere, & ablegatis om-
nibus suis pseudo-categorematis, ne quid suæ spurcitiei retineret, & veternum
7Cf. [73], 2v-3r. Here is J. W. Smith’s translation [cf. [39], pp. 318-319]: “Behold, the art which I present
is new, but in truth so old, so spoiled and defiled by the barbarians, that I considered it necessary, in order
to introduce an entirely new form into it, to think out and publish a new vocabulary, having gotten rid of
all its pseudo-technical terms lest it should retain its filth and continue to stink in the old way, but since till
now ears have been little accustomed to them, it will be hardly avoidable that many will be offended and
frightened away at the very threshold. And yet underneath the Algebra or Almucabala which they lauded
and called ‘the great art’, all Mathematicians recognized that incomparable gold lay hidden, though they
used to find very little. There were those who vowed hecatombs and made sacrifice to the Muses and Apollo
if any one would solve some one problem or other of the order of such problems as we solve freely by score,
since our art is the surest finder of all things mathematical.” For a French translation, cf. [65], 227.
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redoleret, excogitare necesse habuerim, & emittere nova vocabula, quibus cum
parum hactenus sint adsue factæ aures, vix accidet, ut vel abipso limine non
deterreantur multi & offendantur. At sub sua, quam prædicabant, & magnam
artem vocabant, Algebra vel Almucabala, incomparandum latere aurum omnes
adgnoscebant Mathematici, inveniebant vero minime. Vovebant Hecatombas, &
sacra Musis parabant & Apollini, si quis unum vel alterum problema extulisset,
ex talium ordine qualium decadas & eicadas ultro exhibemus, ut est ars nostra
mathematum omnium inventrix certissima.
Provided that the art which Vie`te is speaking of at the beginning of this quotation is
identified with his new algebra, these few lines suggest a number of things to us: i) that
Vie`te presents his new algebra as an art, that is, a technique or a system of techniques,
rather than as a discipline or a theory; ii) that, according to Vie`te, it would have been
already present, in nuce, in ancient mathematics, that is, presumably, that it would have
been practiced, in its primitive form, by Greek mathematicians; iii) that Vie`te takes his
main contribution to consist in a reformulation of such an art, so that what is properly
new, according to him, is not the art itself, but the form he has given to it; iv) that,
according to Vie`te again, his new algebra would also have been present, in nuce, in Arabic,
and more generally medieval, mathematics, and that his own reformulation would have
revealed a general technique that is hidden n this algebra and only implicitly applied to
some individual cases8; v) that this technique applies to the solution of problems, so as
to make it possible, once correctly formulated, to solve several problems at once. In his
letter to the Princess Catherine de Parthenay, Vie`te does not speak of analysis, but the
comparison of the previous quotation with the Isagoge (where the term “algebra” does not
occur at all), and specially with its well-known first chapter (to which there will be no need
to come back), immediately suggests that the techniques which Vie`te is speaking of—that
is, his new algebra—is part of, or even should be identified with, a sort of problematic
analysis, and that this sort of analysis, or at least a primitive version of it, was already
practiced by Greek mathematicians and occurred in Arabic mathematics.
With this in mind, the plan of my enquiry becomes natural: I shall try to identify and
describe this sort of analysis, together with the connected technique which Vie`te is referring
to, by looking at both Greek and Arabic mathematical corpus (though I shall obviously
8The Arabic origin of the term “algebra” and of the art it was denoting—that is the “Great Art”—was a
quite accepted fact in early-modern age. Take as examples: [14], 222; [67], IIv.; [12],“Agli Lettori”, column 3;
[15], 4. Nevertheless, very little is known about the effective relations of early-modern mathematicians with
Arabic mathematical sources, and I have nothing to offer on this matter. In the great majority of cases, the
Great Art was understood as part of arithmetic, that is as something like an arithmetic of indeterminate
numbers. It seems however to me that this notion of algebra [to which I shall come back later: p. 10]
is too restricted to account both for Arabic and Vie`te’s conceptions and overall to supply an appropriate
concept to be used to reconstruct the origins of early-modern mathematics and to identify some of its crucial
features.
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limit myself to the consideration of few examples); this will be the subject matter of sections
2 and 3. Before doing that, I think to be useful to consider the previous point (i) in more
detail. This will be the subject matter of section 1. Finally, section 4 will address some
conclusions.
1 On some definitions of “algebra”, particularly Bos’ one
The term “algebra” and its cognates are and have been used by mathematicians and histo-
rians of mathematics with several and often very different meanings. It is not my aim, of
course, to look for something such as the right meaning of this term or to disclose something
such as the real nature of algebra. I would like only to fix one of these meanings.
As I have said, it is the meaning which I suggest we should attribute to such a term
in so far as it occurs in the title of Vie`te’s Opus, and, consequently, when it is supposed
to refer to the ingredient of Vie`te’s mathematics to which he refers in this title. Still,
Vie`te was not an isolated mathematician, and such an ingredient of his mathematics is also
an essential ingredient of early-modern mathematics as a whole, at least before Descartes
(perhaps things change with Descartes’ Geometry, but I cannot discuss this question here).
I suggest moreover to interpret the title of Vie`te’s Opus as referring to an ingredient that
was also present, though under a different formulation, in Greek and medieval mathematics.
As a matter of fact, my aim is thus that of fixing a meaning that we should assign to the
term “algebra” in many of its occurrences in medieval and early-modern mathematical
texts, as well as in our historical reconstructions of the content and the mutual relations
of Greek, medieval and early-modern mathematical texts9.
An important task of historians is certainly to account for differences in language and
conceptions, but, as Henk Bos has rightly emphasized10 in his enlightening book on “geo-
metrical exactness” in early-modern mathematics, “in describing the conceptual develop-
ments that form the subject matter of [. . . ][an historical] study” that is not restricted to a
very compact and small body of texts, “a reasonable constancy of the meanings” of the cru-
cial terms is needed. This would in any case greatly improve our historical reconstructions
in clarity, accuracy, and perspicuity.
For the term “algebra”, when early-modern mathematics is concerned, this is all the
more urgent in so far as its ambiguity has suggested a number of expressions which are
often used to introduce historiographical concerns that do not answer, in my view, any
9This is of course only one of the meanings that the term “algebra” takes in medieval and early-modern
mathematical texts and that we can appropriately assign to it when we use it in our historical reconstruc-
tions. I have elsewhere suggested other meanings for it, when early-modern mathematics is concerned, and
I shall briefly come back to them on pp. 10-13. But to acknowledge a possible plurality of meanings for a
certain term is not the same as admitting that these meanings had not to be accurately differentiated. My
aim is to contribute to just such a differentiation.
10Cf. [13], 119.
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genuine need of understanding. The most frequent of these concerns relies on the presumed
passage that would have occurred in early-modern age from geometry to algebra11. I take
it to be based on an important misunderstanding: by projecting onto early-modern age the
disciplinary organization of contemporary mathematics, one often takes algebra to be, in
that age, a mathematical theory separated from and in fact opposed to geometry. I think
that this is in any case wrong: early-modern mathematics does not include any theory that
one could plausibly term “algebra” and that is separated from geometry and/or arithmetic.
Bos has proposed to “articulate the meaning” of the terms “arithmetic”, “geometry”
and “algebra” in the following way12:
Arithmetic refers to the mathematical theory and practice that dealt with num-
bers.
Geometry refers to the mathematical theory and practice that dealt with geo-
metrical magnitudes [. . . ].
Algebra refers to those mathematical theories and practices that involved un-
knowns and/or indeterminates, employed the algebraic operations, involved
equations, and dealt either with numbers or with geometrical magnitudes or
with magnitudes in an abstract more general sense. In so far as it dealt with
numbers, algebra was part of arithmetic. Algebra dealing with (geometrical or
abstract) magnitudes presupposed (tacitly or explicitly) a redefinition of the
algebraic operations so as to apply to such magnitudes.
The two first definitions are plain, since Bos openly defines the relevant terms “number”
and “geometrical magnitude as we would expect13. He also defines the term “abstract
magnitude”14:
With the term abstract magnitude I refer to mathematical entities that, like
geometrical magnitudes, could be joined, separated, and compared, but whose
further nature was left unspecified.
This is not the case for the term “algebraic operations”, instead. Bos distinguishes15
“operations on numbers”, “geometrical operations”, “operations on abstract magnitudes”
11Sometimes a similar concern is addressed by speaking of analysis instead of algebra. The continuation
of my paper should make clear that I take such concerns to be equally misleading when referred to the
early-modern age. On this matter, cf. [55], 1-44.
12Cf. [13], 128-129.
13Cf. [13], 120. Bos identifies geometrical magnitudes with “line segments, plane figures and solid figures
as far as they were considered as to their size”. I would add angles to the list : cf. [17], vol. V, 395 (letter




and “operations on ratios”. He lists the first and the second ones, establishes a bijective
relation of analogy which links each one of the former with each one of the latter, and
claims16 that “the early modern period witnessed an interest in a ‘universal mathematics’
in which operations such as the arithmetical or geometrical ones were applied to magnitudes
independently of their nature”, and that “Vie`te was the first to elaborate such a theory.”
This makes him able to identify the operations on abstract magnitudes with those that Vie`te
defines in the Isagoge17. Among the operations on numbers, he refers moreover to addition,
subtraction, multiplication, division and extraction of square roots as “quadratic algebraic
operations”, but he abstains from specifying what algebraic operations (on numbers and
magnitudes, both geometrical and abstract) would be, in general.
As Bos himself remarks, “root extraction is a kind of equation solving”18. One can thus
consider that all the operations on numbers that he lists, apart from that of “forming the
ratio of two numbers”—that is, addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, root extrac-
tion and solving polynomial equations—are algebraic. By extension, one can then admit
that this is also the case for the analogous operations on geometrical and abstract magni-
tudes, which we could for short call with the same names as the arithmetic ones. It would
follow that “algebra” refers, for Bos, to the “mathematical theories and practices” which
dealt with numbers, geometrical magnitudes or abstract magnitudes, “involved unknowns
and/or indeterminates” and “employed” the operations of addition, subtraction, multipli-
cation, division, root extraction and solving polynomial equations, as defined on numbers,
geometrical magnitudes and abstract magnitudes, respectively. In other words, “algebra”
would thus be a generic name used to refer to any “theory or practice” concerned with
unknowns and/or indeterminate numbers, geometrical magnitudes or abstract magnitudes
and understandable as a sort of generalization of arithmetic.
The most evident difficulty with this definition is that it is either all-embracing or de-
pends on a hidden shift in the meaning of the term “geometrical operation”: the geometrical
operations are first introduced as constructive procedures19, then surreptitiously identified
with formal rules of transformation, that is, applications, as we say today. Certainly this
shift corresponds to a crucial historical fact. But an appropriate definition of “algebra”
should either make the description (or reconstruction) of this fact possible, or issue from
such a description (or reconstruction), rather than depending on its concealment.
I shall come back to this point shortly20. First, I would like to focus on a distinction
which Bos does not seem to consider as a crucial one: that between theories and practices.
Bos’ definition of “algebra” is essentially different from his definitions of “arithmetic”
and “geometry”: the latter ones depend on the identification of a domain of objects, the
16Cf. [13], 125.
17Cf. [13], 150.
18Cf. [13], 122: the calculation of n
√
a can be reduced, indeed, to the solution of the equation xn− a = 0.
19Cf. [13], 123-125, specially table 6.2.
20Cf. pp. 11-13, below.
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former on the identification of a modus operandi on various and very different sorts of
objects.
I take a mathematical theory to be a piece of mathematics characterized by the domain
of objects which it is about, that is, I hold that a mathematical theory is identified if and
only if a certain domain of objects is so, and—if this is the case—I say that this theory is
about these objects.
Hence, I admit that in so far as they are identified with the pieces of mathematics that
were about numbers and geometrical magnitudes, early-modern arithmetic and geometry
have to be considered as genuine mathematical theories, and that they have to be taken as
well-characterized mathematical theories, provided that these objects are taken, in turn, as
well-identified objects. I shall not discuss here the difficult question as to whether this last
condition should be considered as being satisfied or not (though I think that it should be, at
least within reasonable limits of exactness). I emphasize that, in so far as Bos’ definitions of
“arithmetic” and “geometry” are adopted (apart from the term “practice” which occurs in
them), arithmetic and geometry have to be considered as genuine mathematical theories, in
my sense, and, I suggest to adopt these definitions21, at least for the sake of my argument.
The situation is different for Bos’ definition of “algebra”, since (despite the occurrence of
the term “theories” in it) it is not such as to warrant that algebra is a mathematical theory,
in my sense. When algebra is characterized according to such a definition, it rather appears
as a cluster of practices, or, to use Vie`te’s language, as an art: a system of (mathematical)
techniques. As far as such an art applies both to numbers and geometrical quantities—that
is, the system of techniques that it consists of includes techniques to deal with numbers
and geometrical magnitudes, respectively—algebra can be both “part of arithmetic” (as
Bos explicitly admits) and part of geometry, that is: the term “algebra” can be used
(in so far it is taken as a generic name) to refer either to an arithmetical technique or
to a geometrical technique, or to a system of techniques including both arithmetical and
geometrical techniques.
This is, I think, an appropriate view of the nature of early-modern algebra22 I term it
for short “the inclusive view”, and I take it to be suggested by Bos’ definition (despite his
use of the term “theory”).
Still, this definition suggests more than that. It suggests that “algebra” can also be used
21But, cf. footnote (13).
22Though Barrow’s view on the relations between arithmetic and geometry were quite peculiar in his age,
the following passage from his Lectiones mathematicæ illustrates a similar view [cf. [8], 28; notice that, as
Vie`te, Barrows is identifying analysis and algebra, at least when mathematics is concerned]: “I am wholly
silent about that which is called Algebra or the Analytic Art. I answer, this was not done unadvisedly.
Because indeed Analysis, understood as intimating something distinct from the Rules and Propositions of
Geometry and Arithmetic, seems to belong no more to Mathematics than to Physics, Ethics, or any other
Science. For this is only a Part or Species of Logic, or a certain Manner of using Reason in the Solution of
Questions, and the Invention or Probation of Conclusions, which is often made use of in all other Sciences.
Wherefore it is not a Part or Species of, but rather an Instrument subservient to the Mathematics [. . . ].”
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to refer to a technique to deal with “abstract magnitudes”. Bos’ definition of “abstract
magnitude” can be understood in different ways, however. I maintain that in early-modern
mathematics there was room to join, separate and compare magnitudes, or more generally
quantities (that is, magnitudes and numbers), “whose further nature was left unspecified”,
only in so far as it was admitted that this nature could be later specified, if needed.
This is because intrinsically unspecifiable quantities were not part of the early-modern
mathematical horizon; they only appeared some time later: first and implicitly in Newton’s
fluxional calculus23 and then, explicitly, in Euler’s theory of functions. Thus, I take Bos’
definition of “abstract magnitudes” to be plausible only if the term “unspecified” is taken
there as meaning “not yet specified”, rather than “intrinsically not specifiable”. And, once
this is admitted, I take it to be appropriate and compatible with his definition of “algebra”,
provided that the term “magnitude” be replaced with (or understood as synonymous with)
the term “quantity”. But if it so, “algebra” can refer to a technique to deal with abstract
quantities only in so far as such a technique is understood as being a common technique
subject to being used both in arithmetic and in geometry. And, if so, there is room to admit
that such a technique could be applied to unspecified quantities—that is, to quantities which
were identified neither with numbers nor with geometrical quantities—but not to conceive
it as constituting or being part of a mathematical theory separated from arithmetic and
geometry. Hence, according to Bos’ definitions, as I suggest to understand them, the
inclusive view concerns algebra as a whole, and not only a part of it: algebra is a system
of techniques which belong either to arithmetic or to geometry, or are common to both.
According to me, this is a quite appropriate characterization, and I suggest to adopt it.
Still, this is also a quite general characterization and it can be specified in very different
ways.
According to Bos, the different techniques which belong to algebra concern the oper-
ations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, root extraction and solving poly-
nomial equations, and should involve unknowns and/or indeterminates. But this is vague
enough, again. There are at least two ways to specify such a characterization so as to
satisfy Bos’ constraints and conclude that algebra is, after all, a (mathematical) theory, in
my sense (though included24, of course, in arithmetic, geometry or in their union).
The first way consists in identifying algebra with the system of techniques aiming to
transform and solve polynomial equations. Algebra would then be the theory of polynomial
equations. In so far as these equations were concerned with numbers, it would be part of
arithmetic; in so far as these equations were concerned with geometrical magnitudes, it
would be part of geometry; in so far as these equations were taken as such, that is, inde-
23Cf. [55], specially the Introduction, 1-44.
24The exact nature of the relation of inclusion between theories should be specified starting from a more
precise characterization of the notion of (mathematical) theory. I cannot get onto this question here, however.
I simply remark that the set-theoretic relation of inclusion between the domains of objects of the involved
theories is not appropriate.
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pendently of the nature of the involved quantities, it would be common to both arithmetic
and geometry.
The second way consists in identifying algebra with the system of techniques aiming to
transform the expressions formed by combining, according to appropriate rules of formation,
different symbols referring to quantities and to the operations of addition, subtraction,
multiplication, division and root extraction. Algebra would then be the theory of these
expressions. In so far as the symbols involved in these equations were understood as symbols
for numbers, it would be part of arithmetic; in so far as these terms were understood
as symbols for geometrical magnitudes, it would be part of geometry; in so far as these
terms were understood as symbols for unspecified quantities, it would be common to both
arithmetic and geometry.
When it is understood according to both these characterizations, the notion of arith-
metical algebra appears as perfectly clear and can be fruitfully used in our historical recon-
struction of early-modern and pre-modern mathematics without any other specification, I
think25. Things look different for the notions of geometrical and common algebra. This
depends on the fact that, according to both characterizations, these notions rely on a pre-
vious identification of the operation of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and
root extraction as defined on geometrical or abstract magnitudes.
Consider the case of geometrical magnitudes. As said, Bos introduces them as construc-
tive procedures26, though remarking that they are “analogous” to appropriate operations
on numbers. With respect to classical geometry, this is quite correct, of course. But it is
essential to remark that what is concerned here is just an analogy, rather than an identity
or even an equivalence.
To the well-known (and often repeated) formal differences between arithmetical opera-
tions and the analogous operations of classical geometry, I would like to add the following.
Whereas any arithmetical operation was capable of being expressed through an equality of
the form “∗ (a, b) = c”, or “∗ (a) = c” (in the case of root extraction)—where the symbols
“a”, “b” and “c” denote appropriate numbers and the symbols “∗ (a, b)” and “∗ (a)” denote
any operation on a and b or on a alone—this was not the case for any operation of classical
geometry. A simple example will be enough to illustrate the point : given two segments a
and b, it was certainly possible, in classical geometry, to construct a rectangle R(a, b) hav-
ing them as sides, but this operational relation was not capable of being expressed through
an equality of the form “∗ (a, b) = R(a, b)”: no appropriate object capable of being the
referent of “∗(a, b)” in a similar equality was available, indeed. This depends neither on a
lack of notation, nor on the constraint of homogeneity. It rather depends on the notion of
25The identification of algebra with a part of arithmetic was in fact quite common in early-modern and pre-
modern mathematics. As an example, take the complete title of Bombelli’s Algebra [cf. [12]]—L’Algebra[;]




operation: in arithmetic, operations were understood as applications; in classical geometry,
they were understood as constructions, and in many cases, the passage from a construction
to the corresponding application was far from being immediate.
The five constructions analogous to the arithmetical operations of addition, subtraction,
multiplication, division and root extraction played moreover in classical geometry a role
that was quite different from that played by these operations in arithmetic: the former did
not constitute, as such, a base of elementary constructions to which other constructions
could be reduced by decomposition.
This should be enough to show that, if characterized in the second of the two previous
ways, geometrical algebra appears as a sort of (quite imprecise and undeterminable) dupli-
cate of arithmetical algebra generated through a quite complex process that had its final
stage in early-modern age. The situation is similar for common algebra, since it depends
on the possibility of identifying the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, di-
vision and root extraction as such, that is, independently of the nature of quantities they
are applied to. This possibility appeared only when Vie`te defined them, in the Isagoge,
by means of a sort of axiomatic system, and Descartes defined, in the first book of the
Geometry, the operations of multiplication, division and root extraction on magnitudes
by means of proportions involving an unitary magnitude, in such a way that their formal
properties were exactly coincident with the formal properties of the analogous operations
on numbers.
Though plausible, the second of the two previous characterizations of common algebra
can thus be used—unless algebra were not reduced to arithmetical algebra—only to speak
of a scant and already established part of early modern mathematics.
The first of these two characterizations also depends on the possibility of identifying
the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and root extraction, as
such. Hence, the same conclusion holds for this characterization of common algebra. The
situation could, instead, appear to be different for the first characterization of geometrical
algebra, since a geometrical polynomial equation of first, second or third degree should
be understood as a statement of a problem. The homogenous equality involving a sum of
segments, rectangles or parallelepipeds, which express, respectively, an equation of first,
second or third degree, is, indeed, a condition that a segment has to satisfy. The problem
consists in looking for the segment or the segments which satisfy such a condition27. And, in
so far as such a condition can be easily stated within the limits (and through the language)
of classical geometry, such a problem is in turn a problem of classical geometry. Still, a
similar problem seems to me, as such, far from being understandable as being an object.
Only the equality which expresses its condition, and which is written within a formalism
similar to the one involved in the second characterization of algebra, can be so understood.
Thus, the considerations concerning the second characterization of geometrical algebra also
27Cf. the section 3.
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apply to the first one.
It follows that if the notion of algebra has to be used to reconstruct the origins of
early modern mathematics and its genealogical links with an old tradition of mathematical
endeavors—as Vie`te’s use of the term “algebra” in the title of his Opus invites us to do—,
the two previous characterizations (certainly appropriate for other respects28) should be
replaced by a more comprehensive one. As far as it is suggested by Bos’ definitions, the
inclusive view also invites us to do that. By connecting algebra with the consideration
of “unknowns and/or indeterminates”, Bos is drawing, indeed, our attention to the habit,
very common in medieval mathematics, to speak of algebra when the consideration of some
unknown or the calculation with, or the approximation of, some radicals29 were concerned30.
My aim is to look for such a more comprehensive characterization of algebra and to explain,
at the same time, the strict relation between algebra and analysis that is openly evoked in
the title of Vie`te’s Opus.
2 Two kinds of problematic analysis
The term “analysis” is also greatly ambiguous with respect to its uses both in science—
especially in mathematics—and in philosophy31. However, among its very different mean-
ings, it is fairly easy to pick up one which was reasonably constant from ancient geometry
and philosophy to early modern mathematics32. According to it, analysis is an argumen-
tative pattern, or more generally, a form of reasoning.
Though Aristotle (as well as any other Greek philosopher, so far as I know) never defined
it explicitly, he referred to it on several occasions. A comparison of the relevant passages33
suggests that he understood it as the typical pattern of arguments which: i) start from the
(hypothetical) assumption that something that is not actually given or established—and
that one aims to obtain or establish—is instead given or established; ii) lead to obtaining
or establishing, as a result of an argumentative procedure, something that is independently
given or established; and iii) because of that, either suggest a way of effectively obtaining
or establishing what was aimed to be obtained or established, or directly prove that there
is no way to obtain or establish it.
28I have myself adopted quite similar characterizations of algebra (which I have of course distinguished
among themselves and from other possible ones) in my [55]: cf. ibid., 21.
29Cf. footnote (18).
30An example of that is the Distinctio octava (especially the fourth treatise) of Pacioli’s Summa [cf. [51]].
31Cf. [50], Introduction, IX-XI.
32My [52] is a study of the evolution of the notion of analysis—this term being taken with this meaning—
from Aristotle to Descartes. Though my current views are in some regards different than those I argued
for in this study, my following considerations are based on the material I discussed there. Among other
numerous studies I also base myself on, cf. [43], [36], [40], [69], [29], and [11].
33Cf. [52], 370-383. The passages that I considered there are: Prior Analytics, 51a 18-19; Posterior
Analytics, 78a 6-8, 84a 8, 88b 15-20; Metaphysics, 1005b, 4; Nicomachean Ethics,1112b 20-24.
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The second case mentioned in point (iii) is that of a proof by reductio ad absurdum. In
the first case, analysis is not enough to obtain or establish what is aimed to be obtained
or established. It has thus to be followed by another argument. There is no evidence that
Aristotle understood such another argument as complying with a general pattern (that is,
there is no evidence that Aristotle possessed a general notion of synthesis, as opposed to
his general notion of analysis).
2.1 Pappusian analysis
As far as geometrical analysis is concerned, this is the case of Pappus, instead, at least if
the well-known opening passage of the 7th book of his Mathematical Collection is taken
in the form established by Hultsch’s edition34. In this form, Pappus’ passage presents a
general characterization of the geometrical method of analysis and synthesis, where the
former is depicted in a way that is consistent with Aristotle’s conception and is opposed to
synthesis, understood as another pattern of geometrical argumentation.
In an equally well-known paper which appeared at the end of the 1960s, M. S. Mahoney
argued that this passage is corrupted35, and that in its original form it contained no general
characterization of synthesis. Mahoney’s argument is that in Hultsch’s text, analysis is
characterized in two “incompatible” ways: firstly by identifying it with a “path from what
one is seeking, as if it were established, by way of its consequences, to something that is
established by synthesis”; and secondly by asserting that “in analysis we assume what is
sought as it has been achieved, and look for the thing from which it follows, and again
what comes before that, until by regressing in this way we come upon some one of the
things that are already known, or that occupy the rank of a first principle”36. According to
Mahoney, the second characterization was added by “same later editor” that, “seeing the
single occurrence of the word ‘synthesis’ [. . . ] may have felt the need to add a definition
of it, along with a definition of analysis as he understood it37.” Thus, also the supposed
characterization of synthesis from Pappus would result from an interpolation. Here it
is38: “in synthesis, by reversal, we assume what was obtained last in the analysis to have
been achieved already, and, setting now in natural order, as precedents, what before were
following, and fitting them to each other, we attain the end of the construction of what
was sought.”
As a matter of fact, whereas the first characterization of analysis seems to depict it
as a deduction, the second seems to depict it as the inverse of a deduction, or even—in
34Cf. [57], II, 634, 1 - 636, 14.
35Cf. [43], 321-326.
36Here and later, I quote from Jones’ translation appeared in 1986: cf. [49], 82. Mahoney refers instead




Mahoney’s interpretation—as a conjectural inverse of a deduction39. From a logical point
of view, this is certainly a relevant difference, so relevant that Mahoney thinks that Pappus
could not have presented these two characterizations together40.
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s notion of analysis—at least as I have reconstructed it above—
is compatible with both characterizations. Moreover, the second one seems to be conceived
so as to respond to an intrinsic difficulty which appears some lines later in Pappus’ text, in
a part of this text that there is no reason to consider as being interpolated, where Pappus
distinguishes between the case in which analysis is applied to prove theorems and the case
in which it is applied to solve problems. Here is what Pappus writes41:
In the case of the theorematic kind [of analysis], we assume what is sought as
a fact and true, then, advancing through its consequences, as if they are true
facts according to the hypothesis, to something established, if this thing that
has been established is a truth, then that which was sought will also be true,
and its proof the reverse of the analysis; but if we should meet with something
established to be false, then the thing that was sought too will be false. In the
case of the problematic kind, we assume the proposition as something we know,
then, proceeding through its consequences, as if true, to something established,
if the established thing is possible and obtainable, which is what mathematicians
call “given”, the required will also be possible, and again the proof will be the
reverse of the analysis; but should we meet with something established to be
impossible, then the problem too will be impossible.
As Mahoney remarks, Pappus uses the term “proof” twice where a reader of Hultsch’s
text would have expected that he used the term “synthesis”42. This, however, provides
39Mahoney expresses such a characterization with the schema [cf. [43], 323]:
P
?← P1 ?← P2 ?← . . . ?← Pn ?← K,
where “K” represents what is “already known” and “P” what is “sought”.
40The second characterization fits quite well with Cornford’s definition of analysis as an “upward move-
ment of intuition” looking for “preconditions”: cf. [16], 43. Recently, Fournarakis and Christianidis have
proposed a “new interpretation of geometrical analysis” according to which it would be composed by two
successive parts: an “hypothetical” one, consisting in a “searching from preconditions”, and a “confirma-
tory” one consisting of a “deduction” and aiming to warrant that the hypothetical argument, “if reversed,
constitute[s] a deduction” [cf. [24], 10-11 of the pre-print. A similar pattern seems however to be satis-
fied by quite a few arguments among those that are habitually understood as examples of analysis. One
of them (the solution of the proposition 105 of the 7th book of Pappus’ Collection) is reconstructed and
discussed in Fournarakis and Christianidis’ paper. For a more general model of analysis and synthesis
including four stages—two for analysis, transformation and resolution, and two for synthesis, construction
and demonstration—(and based on Hankel’s classical model [cf. [33]]), cf. [11], 11-13.
41Cf. [49], 82-84.
42Cf. [43], 325. This is another argument for Mahoney’s thesis.
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no difficulty. The difficulty lies rather in the fact that Pappus says in both cases that the
proof, or synthesis, is the “reverse of the analysis”, which could be the case only if analysis
were a deduction composed of nothing but (logically) reversible implications. The second
of the two previous characterizations of analysis seems just have been conceived to answer
this difficulty: analysis would be reversible, in so far as it were not a deduction but rather
the inverse of a deduction, or an abduction as Peirce would have said.
According to Mahoney, the difficulty is solved, instead, by observing that in mathemat-
ics “the usual state of affairs” is reversibility of deduction, since “mathematics operates
primarily with biconditional connectors” and this is the situation of Greek mathematical
analysis43. But in this way, a logical difficulty is solved by appealing to a contingent feature
of mathematical arguments: a usual, but not necessary one.
Rather than to appeal to the usual features of a mathematical arguments in order to
discard a logical possibility (after having discarded a characterization of analysis based
on logical considerations), is it not better to admit that Pappus understood his double
characterization of analysis and synthesis as vague enough to fit with different logical
possibilities which different arguments could comply with? Moreover, if the problem is that
of reconstructing a general notion of mathematical analysis that was operating in early-
modern mathematics and could be brought back to Pappus, is it not more appropriate to
accept the apparent incoherence of Pappus’ text, in Hultsch’s form—which is also the form
under which this text appeared in Commandinus’ edition of the Collection44—, and try to
extract from it a characterization of the geometrical method of analysis and synthesis that
fits with early-modern applications of it45?
It seems to me that there is room for doing that, provided that the question of the
direction of the inferences occurring in analysis and synthesis, consisting in wondering
whether they should be deductive or abductive inferences, is distinguished from the question
of the structural direction of analysis and synthesis, consisting in wondering which should be
the logical nature of their initial and final points. The problem of reversibility of analysis is
concerned only with the former, but possibly this is not the crucial question which Pappus’
characterization of analysis and synthesis is concerned with46. Possibly, the crucial question
43Cf. [43], 326-327.
44Cf. [56], 157r: “Resolutio igitur est via a quæsito tanquam concesso per ea, quæ deinceps consequuntur
ad aliquod concessum in compositione: in resolutione enim id quod que¸ritur tamquam factu¯ ponentes,
quid ex hoc contingat, consideramus: & rursum illius antecedens, quousque ita progredientes incidamus in
aliquod iam cognitum, vel quod sit e` numero principiorum.”
45This seems also to be Bos’ proposal in chapter 5 of his [13].
46This is also the opinion of Hintikka and Remes for which “this aspect of the concepts of analysis
and synthesis is one of the more superficial ones” [cf. [36], 11]. Despite that, they have proposed [cf.
ibid, chapter II, 7-21] a simple way to reconcile the two characterizations of analysis occurring in Pappus’
text under Hultsch’s form. It simply consists in translating the term “α
,
κo´λoυθoν” which occurs in the
first characterization, as well as in the successive description of theorematic and problematic analysis, with
“concomitants”, rather than with “consequences” as it is usually done. In this way, the first characterization
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is rather the latter. This is also suggested by Aristotle’s characterization of analysis, since
it depends on the structural direction of the relevant argument rather than on the logical
nature of the inferences which occur in it.
Let us consider this question in more detail, in the light of Pappus’ distinction between
problematic and theorematic analysis. In classical geometry, what is properly sought in
the solution of a problem is an object satisfying a certain condition, and this is considered
as being found when an appropriate construction of it is tracked down. Thus, problematic
analysis should start with (the supposition that) such an object (is given) and proceed to
(the statement that) other objects, that are actually given or established to be impossible
(are given). What is instead sought in the proof of a theorem is the truth or falsehood of a
certain statement, and this is considered as being established when either this statement or
its negation are deduced from other statements whose truth is already established. Thus,
theorematic analysis should start with (the supposition of the truth of) the first statement
and proceed to (the statement of the truth of) other statements whose truth-value is known.
If so, in both the problematic and the theorematic case, analysis and synthesis have inverse
structures: in both cases, the starting point of analysis is (the supposition that) something
that is not actually given or established (is instead given or established), whereas its final
point is (the statement that) something that is actually so (is so); also in both cases, the
starting point of synthesis is the final point of analysis, whereas its final point is the starting
point of analysis.
I guess that when Pappus argues that synthesis, or better “proof”, is the “reverse of the
analysis”, he refers to their structures, rather than to the logical nature of the inferences
that occur in them, which—he seems to admit—might vary from case to case47. This is the
same as suggesting that Pappus’ characterization of the method of analysis and synthesis
consists in a structural description of the two subsequent stages of this method. Let us
call, for short, this characterization, so understood, “Pappus’ structural description”.
The question arises whether Pappus’ structural description is appropriate. To answer
this question, I shall consider three examples, one for the theorematic case, and two for
the problematic case. All these three examples concern arguments where the method of
analysis and synthesis is openly used. For the theorematic case, there are very few cases
in the pre-modern and early-modern mathematical corpus where this is so48; I have chosen
of analysis becomes quite vague with respect to the logical nature of the inferences occurring in it, to the
effect that the second takes a prominent role.
47This pattern is consistent with Berggren and Van Brummelen’s following remarks [Cf. [11], 9]: “One
must, on the evidence, accept the fact that both reduction (a search for preconditions) and deduction (a
search for consequences) were regarded by ancient writers as being activities included under the rubric of
‘analysis’.”
48Cf. [49], 67. According to Knorr, the notion of theorematic analysis is anyway “gratuitous”, and
“to the extent that [. . . ][Pappus] is viewing the expository form of the method, rather than its heuristic
role, he seems not to sense that [. . . ][theorematic] analyses are entirely redundant” [cf. ibid., 358 and the
note (51), above]. In as far as my paper is essentially concerned with problematic analysis, I shall not
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that which is most frequently discussed49. For the problematic case, the situation is similar
for the Greek mathematical corpus, since, as it is well known, Greek mathematicians used
to hide their analysis. The example I have chosen is drawn from one of the few treatises
in this corpus—the Cutting-off of a Ratio, by Apollonius50—where the method of analysis
and synthesis is openly used. The third example concerns early-modern mathematics. I
have chosen it because it is one of those which Bos presents in his book, where a general
characterization of Pappusian analysis and synthesis—which I shall discuss later—is also
presented.
2.1.1 An example of theorematic analysis
The first example concerns the proof of proposition XIII.1 of the Elements which is con-
tained in an interpolation to Euclid’s text, possibly due to Heron, and probably composed
sometime between the first and the third century of the Christian era, or perhaps even after
Pappus composed his Mathematical Collection51. Such an interpolation contains alterna-
tive proofs for the first five propositions of book XIII, all of them applying the method of
analysis and synthesis52. The proposition XIII.1 states that if a segment a is cut in such a
discuss this question here. I remark however that the Elements present several instances of analysis used
to prove theorems but complying with the problematic pattern. They concern the (constructive) proofs of
non-constructibility (or non-existence) of certain mathematical objects which are conducted by reductio ad
absurdum. Two examples are propositions I.7 and I.27: an object (namely a point) is supposed to be given
(that is, a problem is supposed to have been solved), and the negation of an already proved theorem is
deduced. In these cases, analysis is, so to say, mixed: partly problematic and partly theorematic.
49For example by Mahoney: cf. [43], 326-327.
50Apollonius’ text has arrived to us in an Arabic translation [the Arabic text has never been printed; for
a recent English translation cf. [6]] and translated into Latin by Halley in 1706: cf. [5].
51This interpolation is edited in [23], IV, 198-204. On its attribution to Heron cf. [35], 58 and [22], III, 442.
On Heron’s dates and the date of composition of such an interpolation, cf. [48], [34], II, 298-306, and [40], 355,
which, without adopting a definite position regarding the attribution of the interpolation, simply remarks
that “an actual dependence of the scholiast on Pappus is entirely possible”.
52These proofs are preceded by a general characterization of the method of analysis and synthesis. Here
is Heath’s translation of it [cf. [22], III, 442]: “Analysis is the assumption of that which is sought as if it
were admitted <and the arrival> by means of its consequences at something admitted to be true. Synthesis
is an assumption of that which is admitted <and the arrival> by means of its consequences at the end or
attainment of what is sought.” In another version one finds, instead of the words “the end or attainment
of what is sought”, the same words, “something admitted to be true”, occurring in the characterization of
analysis, but this seems to be due to a corruption of the text. According to Mahoney [cf. [43] 321], this is a
“probably pre-Euclidean” characterization that the scholiast would have simply reported. The attribution
to Heron of such a characterization and of the following alternative proofs for the first five propositions of
book XIII [cf. footnote (51)] depends on their alleged similarity with Heron’s characterization of analysis and
synthesis and his considerations and alternative proofs of the propositions 2-10 contained in his commentary
to the propositions 1-14 of the book II of Euclid’s Elements, as reported by Nayr¯ız¯ı. Here is Gherard of
Cremona’s Latin translation of Heron’s characterization of analysis and synthesis: “Dissolutio autem est,
cum qualibet questione proposita dicimus: ponamus illud in ordine rei quesite que est inventa, deinde
reducemus ad rem cuius probatio iam precessit. Cum ergo manifestum est, diciumus quod iam inventa
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way that its parts α and β satisfy the proportion a : α = α : β and b is the half of it, then
the square constructed on the conjunction γ of b and α is five times the square constructed
on b. Suppose that for any pair of segments α and β, Q(α) and R(α, β) are respectively
the square constructed on α and the rectangle constructed on α and β53. Thus the analysis
goes as follows:
Let’s suppose that: Q(γ) = 5Q(b). A.1
For γ = b+ α
and El., II.4
: Q(α) + 2R(b, α) = Q(γ)−Q(b). A.2
For A.1-2: Q(α) + 2R(b, α) = 4Q(b). A.3
For a = 2b
and El., II.1
: 2R(b, α) = R(a, α). A.4
For a : α = α : β
and El., VI.17
: Q(α) = R(a, β). A.5
For A.3-5: R(a, β) +R(a, α) = 4Q(b). A.6
For α+ β = a
and El., II.2
: R(a, β) +R(a, α) = Q(a). A.7
For A.6-7: Q(a) = 4Q(b). A.8
The equality (A.8) ends the analysis, since it follows from the condition a = 2b alone,
according to El.II.4 or El.II.2 and El.II.3, and is thus already established. The synthesis,
that is the proof of the equality (A.1), under the conditions α+ β = a = 2b, a : α = α : β,
est res quesita secundum dissolutionem. Compositio vero est ut incipiamus a re nota, deinde componamus
donec res quesita inveniatur; ergo tunc res quesita iam erit manifesta secundum compositionem” [cf. [4], 74;
cf. also [21], Suppl., 89]. In fact, this is a characterization quite different from the scholiast’s one. Moreover
Heron’s alternative proofs of propositions II.2-10 are far from being similar to the scholiast’s alternative
proofs of the propositions of book XIII.1-5: in both cases, Euclid’s diagrams are replaced by more simple
ones consisting in nothing but a segment on which an appropriate number of points is taken, but whereas
in the latter ones no reference to rectangles is actually needed and no other diagrams have to be imagined
[cf. p. 32, below], in the former ones, it is asked to consider other appropriate segments together with the
“surfaces which are contained by” them [cf. [4], 74; cf. also [21], Suppl., 90]. Thus, when Heron remarks
that the proposition 11 (which, in contrast to the prior ones, is a problem) “cannot be proved without
diagram” [cf. [4], 86; cf. also [21], Suppl., 106], he seems to mean that the relevant diagrams have to be
drawn rather than simply supposed.
53In fact, in the original text the segments are indicated by two letters referring to a pair of points on
a diagram and no particular symbol is used for denoting rectangles. As both analysis and synthesis are
independent of this diagram, and the features of them that I want to notice do not bear on what notation
is used, I do not see any detriment in adopting a more expeditious notation. I shall come back to the role
of the diagram in this argument in section 2.2.3.
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and γ = b+ α, is simply the inversion of it:
For a = 2b
and El., II.4
: Q(a) = 4Q(b). S.1
For α+ β = a
and El., II.2
: R(a, β) +R(a, α) = Q(a). S.2
For S.1-2: R(a, β) +R(a, α) = 4Q(b). S.3
For a : α = α : β
and El., VI.17
: R(a, β) = Q(α). S.4
For a = 2b
and El., II.1
: R(a, α) = 2R(b, α). S.5
For S.3-5: Q(α) + 2R(b, α) = 4Q(b). S.6
For γ = b+ α
and El., II.4
: Q(α) + 2R(b, α) = Q(γ)−Q(b). S.7
For S.6-7: Q(γ) = 5Q(b). S.8
I shall back to this argument in section 2.2.3. For now, I limit myself to remark that
it perfectly complies with Pappus’ structural description and is such that analysis and
synthesis are the perfect inverse of each other.












This is not the case in a number of other ar-
guments that one may want to consider as
genuine examples of the method described
by Pappus, in the problematic case, and
that, as a matter of fact, have been so under-
stood or even so openly presented. Namely,
it is not the case in the two following argu-
ments.
The first is that which Apollonius relies
on to solve the first case of the first “locus”
in the first book of the Cutting-off of a Ra-
tio54. The problem consists in looking for a straight line through a given point O (fig. 1),
cutting two other parallel straight lines HK and IJ given in position in two points M and N
such that the segments AM and BN, taken on these lines from two given points A and B,
54Cf. [5], 1-3.
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are to each other in a given ratio, under the condition that the point O is inside the angle
formed by the straight lines AB and BN and the straight line OM is supposed to cut the
given straight lines respectively between A and K and between B and J.
Apollonius supposes the problem solved, traces the straight line AO cutting BN in C,
and remarks that AM : CN = AO : CO, so that the ratio between AM and CN is given.
But, since the ratio between AM and BN is given as a condition of the problem, this means
that the ratio between BN and CN is also given by composition, and, from here, the ratio
between BC and CN is given by subtraction, so that the point N is given. This ends
the analysis. In the synthesis, Apollonius then constructs the point N by constructing the
fourth proportional CN between the given segment BC and two other segments constructed
according to what the analysis suggests.
As a matter of fact, the analysis ends by stating that the point N is given, though this
point is actually the one sought. This seems to contrast with Pappus’ structural description.
Still, Apollonius’ argument starts by stating a proportion involving two segments—AM and
CN —which are given if and only if the point N is given, and consists in comparing this
proportion with other ones—also involving some segments which are given if and only if the
point N is given—so as to get a proportion involving only a segment such as these, together
with three segments which are actually given. Hence, it is quite easy to reformulate it in
such a way that it satisfies Pappus’ structural description. The analysis would then go as
follows:
Let’s suppose that the point N is given. A.1
Then, as the points B and C are given,
the ratio between BC and CN is given.
A.2
And thus also the ratio between
BN and CN is given by addition.
A.3
But the ratio between AM and BN is
given, thus the ratio between AM and
CN is given by composition.
A.4
Thus the ratio between AO and CO is given. A.5
Step (A.5) would end the analysis, since the segments AO and CO, and thus their ratio,
are actually given, that is, they are given independently of the supposition that the point
N is given. Thus, analysis would start with (the supposition that) the point N (is given)
and would proceed to the (statement that the) ratio between the segments AO and CO (is
actually given), according to Pappus’ structural description. Hence, the synthesis would
start with the (statement that the) ratio between the segments AO and CO (is given), then
proceed to (the determination of) the ratio between the segments BN and CN, and continue
up to (the determination of) the point N. Let the proportion AM : BN = a : b (where a and
b are two given segments) be a condition of the problem. The synthesis would then go as
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follows:
Construct c such that AO : CO = a : c
(BN and CN should thus be such that
BN : CN = b : c).
S.1
Construct the difference b− c. S.2
Construct N such that BC : CN = b− c : c . S.3
Similar considerations apply to the example Bos advanced to support the thesis that
in “the actual practice of analysis as we find it in classical and early modern sources [. . . ]
[the] direction of argument was not so definite”, although such an analysis always “started
with the assumption of the required55”. This concerns Ghetaldi’s solution of the following
problem56: two segments a and b and an angle ϕ being given, construct on a a triangle
whose other sides x and y are such that y = b+ x and whose angle opposite to y is equal
to ϕ. Bos’ reconstruction of Ghetaldi’s analysis ends by stating that the sought triangle is
given and that the direction of the analysis is “exactly the same57” as that of the synthesis.
Once again it is quite easy to reformulate Ghetaldi’s arguments in such a way that it
complies with Pappus’ structural description. The analysis would go as follows:
Let’s suppose that the triangle ABC (fig. 2)
constructed on the segment BC = a, and such
that AB = y, AC = x, and ACˆB = ϕ, is given.
A.1
Then the straight line AC is given, and so
a point D on it, such that AD = AB = y.
A.2
It follows that the triangle BDC is given. A.3
Thus, the sides BC and CD and the angle








Step (A.4) would end the analysis, since the sides BC = a
and CD = b and the angle BCˆD = pi − ϕ are actually given.
As the triangle BDC is given in its turn if its sides BC and
CD and its angle BCˆD are given, it would then be easy to
start the synthesis with the (statement that the) segments
BC and CD and the angle BCˆD (are given), then proceed to
(the construction of) the triangle BDC, and then continue up
to (the determination of) the triangle ABC. It would thus go
55Cf. [13], 102.




Construct the triangle BDC on the
segments a and b taken, so as to form
an angle complementary to the angle ϕ.
S.1
Construct at B, on the straight line DB, an
angle equal to the angle CDˆB.
S.2
Produce the side of this angle other than
DB, so as to cut the straight line CD in A.
S.3
Though this synthesis is not the inversion of the analysis step by step, it is clearly suggested
by the analysis, and has not the same direction of the latter, as it is, instead, the case in
Bos’ formulation of Ghetaldi’s argument.
2.1.3 Intra-configurational (problematic) analysis
Apollonius’ and Ghetaldi’s arguments should doubtless be understood as genuine examples
of the method of problematic analysis and synthesis. In so far as they do not comply, as
such, with Pappus’ structural description, they seem to show that this description is not
appropriate for characterizing this method. Still, the fact that these arguments can be
reformulated in such a way that they comply with this description is not irrelevant. It
suggests that there is room for detecting a common pattern, which both these arguments
and their previous reformulations are complying with, and which is just that of Pappusian
problematic analysis and synthesis. One could then argue that Pappus’ structural descrip-
tion should not be taken by the letter, but rather understood as a fairly vague way to evoke
such a pattern. This is precisely what I suggest.
This is obviously a twofold pattern. First comes a stage—the analysis—which consists in
reasoning on a configuration of given and ungiven58 geometrical objects and data so as those
that are ungiven were given, and leads to isolate in it a sub-configuration that only includes
the objects and data that are given though determining the whole configuration. This first
stage aims to suggest the way to perform the second—the synthesis—which consists in
constructing the objects which are sought based on the sub-configuration of given objects
and data isolated in the analysis. Such a general pattern can be better detailed. Once
a certain geometrical problem is supposed to be solved, its hypothetical solution displays
an hypothetical configuration of geometrical objects and data, some of which are given
according to the conditions of the problem, while others are not actually given, being
rather required in order for the problem to be solved. This configuration is represented by
a diagram together with appropriate information concerned with its elements (like the value
58The term “ungiven” means of course here “not yet given” or “actually not given”.
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of a ratio, a polygon, or a perimeter, that is, what I term “data”59). Analysis is based on
such a diagram and this information. Eventually, it includes an auxiliary construction that
extends the diagram conservatively. This is a construction permitted under the supposition
that all the objects entering such a configuration and the relative information are given60.
The aim is to isolate in such a configuration, or in the extended one, a sub-configuration
which only consists of given objects (and is thus actual rather than hypothetical) and
which, together with the information that is available, determines (by construction) the
entire configuration which would supply the solution of the problem. Synthesis operates on
the sub-diagram isolated in analysis. Starting from such a sub-diagram, it constructs the
objects that are sought61.
According to such a pattern, analysis is thoroughly internal to the configuration—
represented by an appropriate diagram—which corresponds to the hypothetical solution of
the problem, or at least to a (conservative) extension of it. This is why I suggest to term
the analysis which complies with this pattern “intra-configurational analysis” (taking of
course for granted that it is problematic).
My characterization of intra-configurational analysis fits well enough with the “two
59The question concerning the nature of these data is one of the more difficult questions about the
interpretation of classical geometrical texts: is the value of a ratio nothing but a pair of segments (or
numbers) and the value of a polygon or a perimeter nothing but a square or a segment, respectively, or are
they something essentially different (and, so to say, more abstract)? I cannot but leave this question open,
here. I simply remark that if the former answer is espoused, than data are nothing but geometrical objects,
in turn.
60Hintikka and Remes have strongly emphasized the possibility (and in certain cases the necessity) of
such a construction [cf. [36], especially ch. V, 41-48]. Two examples of it are the drawing of straight line
AO (fig. 1) and of the segment DB (fig. 2) in Apollonius’ and Ghetaldi’s arguments, respectively.
61This pattern fits well enough with the model suggested by Behboud, which was intended to account
for Pappus’ own use of the method of analysis and synthesis in the 7th book of his Collection (occurring
in 13 problems and about ten theorems of this book [cf. [10], 57]). Here is as Behboud describes this
model (only for the case of problematic analysis) [cf. ibid., 70]: “Suppose that it is required to [. . . ] solve
∀x¯ [ϕ(x¯)⇒ ∃y¯χ (x¯, y¯)] [that is, in his notation: “given ϕ’s, find (or determine) χ’s”, where “the barred
variables abbreviates tuples of variables ranging over geometrical objects [. . . ] and ϕ [. . . ] and χ stands for
(complex) relations which may be obtained between these objects”: cf. ibid., 58]. Then [. . . ] one starts with





are already given. Moreover, the accompanying diagram may be supplemented by suitable
auxiliary objects constructed from a¯ or a¯ together with b¯. In the transformation various properties of the
figure are derived using only a restricted set of reversible rules [notice that this constraint is not included
in my pattern] and observing the uniqueness condition for the zeˆtoumenon [that which is sought], until
one comes ‘upon some one of the things [. . . ]’ [. . . ] that are given. [. . . ] The resolution proceeds to show
that the thing known holds independently of the zeˆtoumenon, or that all the auxiliary objects are given
on the basis of a¯ alone and that they together with a¯ determine b¯. The synthesis [. . . ] starts starts by
turning the information obtained in the resolution into an ‘explicit’ construction. The demostration part
[. . . ] essentially reverse the A-tree [that is, the system of inferences composing the analysis] with respect to
the zeˆtoumenon, which may be supplemented by additional steps that show how to derive the root of the
A-tree independently from the zeˆtoumenon.”
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characteristic features of a classical analysis of problems” identified by Bos: the fact that
“it proceeded by means of a concept ‘given’, and [that] it was performed with respect to a
figure in which the required elements were supposed to be drawn already62.” I add that the
final aim of intra-configurational analysis is to isolate, in the configuration represented by
this figure (but I prefer to use the term “diagram”), a sub-configuration that only consists
of given objects and data and which determines (by construction) the entire configuration
which would supply the solution of the problem. I also emphasize that intra-configurational
analysis extends, if need be, the hypothetical configuration which is displayed once the
problem is supposed to be solved, but leaves it otherwise unaltered63.
2.2 Another kind of problematic analysis
The previous pattern is respected by a large number of arguments that have been under-
stood as particular instances of the method of problematic analysis and synthesis and that
form a very relevant corpus within both classical and early-modern mathematics. Still,
early-modern mathematics presents another relevant corpus of arguments that have been
also also been understood as examples of the method of problematic analysis and synthesis,
and whose first part complies, in fact, with conditions (i) and (iii) included in Aristotle’s
characterisation of analysis64. This invites us to contrast intra-configurational analysis with
another kind of problematic analysis.
There is a simple way to do it: one could remark that, in the Isagoge, Vie`te promoted
a substantial reform of the method of problematic analysis and synthesis, and argue that
such another kind of problematic analysis is nothing but the one that Vie`te described in the
Isagoge, then applied, for example, in his Zeteticorum Libri. This would lead to identifying
non-Pappusian problematic analysis65 with problematic analysis a` la Vie`te. This strategy
presents two difficulties, however. The first depends on the fact that Vie`te’s pattern of
problematic analysis is quite particular and does not fit, at least in its details, with many
arguments produced by other early-modern mathematicians and that it would be plausible
to understand as examples of a non-Pappusian kind of analysis (it should be enough to
think of Descartes’ geometry in order to be convinced of that). The second is more directly
62Cf. [13], 100. I understand that Bos is speaking here of a particular version (namely the Euclidean one)
of the concept p(to be) givenq, rather than of a given concept, since what are properly given in classical
geometrical arguments are objects rather than concepts.
63This is also not far from what Hintikka and Remes say [cf. [36], 38]: “The most important aspects [of
analysis (in classical or Pappusian sense)] seem to be (i) the idea of studying the interrelation of geometrical
objects in a given configuration and (ii) the general heuristic idea of bringing the maximal information to
bear on this configuration [. . . ].”
64Cf. p. 13, above.
65Notice that with the term “Pappusian problematic analysis”, I do not mean to refer to the common
form of all examples of problematical analysis that should have been contained in the mathematical corpus
selected by Pappus, the so-called Treasury (or Domain) of Analysis [cf.: [22], I, 138; [36], 8; [49] 82], but
rather to the form of problematic analysis that I have described in section 2.1.
25
concerned with the subject matter of my paper. Vie`te’s reform not only might be conceived
as the starting point of a mathematical program, but it should also be understood in the
light of an older mathematical tradition from which it results. This is what Vie`te himself
invites us to do66. By identifying non-Pappusian problematic analysis with problematic
analysis a` la Vie`te, we would ipso facto prevent ourselves from the possibility of suggesting
that the kernel of this tradition is a non-Pappusian form of analysis. This, however, is what
I would like to suggest. Hence, I cannot be satisfied with such an identification.
2.2.1 Bos’ pattern of algebraic method of problematic analysis and synthesis
A fortiori, I cannot be satisfied with the identification of non-Pappusian analysis with
algebraic analysis, if the latter is identified, in turn, with the typical kind of analysis
promoted by Vie`te. This is Bos’ suggestion. Here is what he writes67:
Algebra entered geometry through its use in the analysis of problems and from
c. 1590 the development of this analytical use of algebra can be identified as
the principal dynamics [. . . ] within the early modern tradition of geometrical
problem solving. From 1591 onward Vie`te consciously and explicitly advocated
the use of algebra as an alternative method of analysis, applicable in geometry as
well as in arithmetic. [. . . ] This use of algebra in geometry had been pioneered
by some Renaissance mathematicians before 1590, but it was Vie`te’s conscious
identification of this method with analysis that brought it into the centre of
attention.
Bos is clearly referring here to problematic analysis. According to his definition of
“algebra”, to say that the analysis which enters the solution of a problem is algebraic is
the same as saying that it employs the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication,
division, root extraction and solving polynomial equations as defined on the relevant mag-
nitudes. This depends on the reduction of the problem to a system of equations. Once this
reduction is fulfilled, the formalism connected with these operations—that is, in Vie`te’s
case, that which is introduced in the Isagoge—works by itself, or better: independently of
the specific nature of the problem these equations come from. This is of course the crucial
point. Bos emphasizes this point by refining his characterization of “algebraic analysis”
and including it in a more general pattern that we could term for short “Bos’ pattern of
algebraic method of problematic analysis and synthesis”68:





A: The derivation of the algebraic equation from the problem.
A’: If possible, the algebraic solution of the equations, that is, finding an ex-
plicit algebraic expression for the unknown. Otherwise, if necessary a rewriting
of the equation into some standard form.
B: The construction of the problem based on the expression found in A’, or,
if such an expression was lacking or uninformative, on the basis of the equation
found in A (if necessary reduced to some standard form).
C: The proof that that construction was correct.
ItemsA andA’ constituted the analysis. [. . . ] PartB, the construction, started
from the given elements and operated on them in the manner indicated by the
explicit expression in A’ or by the structure of the coefficients in the equation
found in A [. . . ]. Thus the direction of the synthesis was opposite to that of the
analysis, but it did not retrace the steps of the analysis. The construction used
the equation or its solution, but not the way it was derived in the analysis.
This is a faithful and accurate description of the way in which Vie`te’s formalism (or
an equivalent one) operated in problematic analysis and synthesis as they occur in a large
corpus of early modern mathematical texts. I wonder however: is the structure of an
argument that is supposed to comply with Bos’ pattern the effect or the precondition of
the introduction of this formalism? Bos’ answer clearly points to the first option. Instead,
I propose the second answer.
2.2.2 A generalization of Bos’ pattern.
More particularly, I propose to appeal to an independent characterization of such a structure—
that is, to describe a pattern of a method of problematic analysis and synthesis different
from Pappus’ one—and to define algebra afterward as a mathematical technique—or bet-
ter, a system of mathematical techniques, i. e. an art—used to solve a certain class of
problems through the application of such a method, and particularly of a non-Pappusian
(that is non-intra-configurational) kind of analysis. In other words, I propose to reverse
the direction of Bos’ characterization, not from algebra in his sense to a non-classical kind
of analysis, but from the latter to algebra in my sense.
Bos’ pattern of algebraic method of problematic analysis and synthesis matches a num-
ber of arguments that differ each from one another according to their particular nature.
To describe what is common to these problems, let me introduce a convenient terminol-
ogy. I suggest to term “purely quantitative” those problems and conditions that depend
only on the relative size of some homogenous quantities. This is the case of both every
arithmetical problem and every problem concerned with abstract quantities, since numbers
and abstract quantities are characterized, with respect to each other, based only on their
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positions in the numerical order and on their mutual operational relations, respectively.
But this is not the case of every geometrical problem, since geometrical magnitudes are
often characterized based on their respective positions in space.
This being established, let us wonder under which conditions a problem could be solved
through an argument that complies with Bos’ pattern. A necessary condition is that this
problem could be reduced to a system of “algebraic equations”. I suppose that by speaking
of algebraic equations, Bos is referring to polynomial equations. Thus the question is:
which problems could be reduced to a system of polynomial equations?
The question is relevant only for geometrical problems, since, for arithmetical problems
or problems concerned with abstract quantities, the answer is merely that this is the case
for any problem concerned with addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and root
extraction, that is, for any problem that one could enunciate relying on Vite’s formalism
or, in the case of arithmetical problems, on any analogous system of standard codified
procedures to be applied to determinate and indeterminate numbers69.
In conformity with the formalism of the Isagoge, a necessary condition for a geometrical
problem to be subject to being reduced to a system of polynomial equations is that its
conditions could be expressed either in the form of proportions involving four segments,
two segments and two rectangles, or two homogeneous magnitudes of any sort and two
numbers, or in the form of equalities between two sums of magnitudes (which, in order to
be added each to other, have to be mutually homogenous)70. It is easy to understand that
conditions that are so expressed are purely quantitative. It follows that among geometrical
problems only purely quantitative ones could be solved through an argument that complies
with Bos’ pattern, using Vite’s formalisms.
From a very general point of view, these problems can be distinguished in two classes:
problems which are directly formulated so as to depend on nothing but purely quantitative
conditions; problems which are firstly formulated so as to depend on some non purely
quantitative, or positional, conditions.
Among the former, there are classical problems like the problem of construction of two
mean proportionals between two given segments, problems of application of areas, prob-
lems of partition of a given segment into two parts satisfying some conditions relative to the
quantitative relations of two appropriate rectangles, or, more generally, problems asking
for the side of appropriate rectangles or parallelepipeds satisfying some mutual quantita-
tive conditions. Based on El.VI.16, and admitting that the construction of a rectangle
on two segments corresponds to the multiplication of these segments, these problems are
immediately identified with the problems of solving appropriate equations of first, second
or third degree. And once this identification is admitted and a formalism such as Vie`te’s
69An obvious example is the system of procedures at work in Diophantus’ arithmetic, the explicit model
of Vie`te’s zetetica [cf. [19], I, [20], [27], 116-133, [28], and [25]],.
70These possibilities are of course not exclusive, since the formalism of the Isagoge allows the transfor-
mation of proportions into equalities.
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one is introduced, these problems can be solved by relying on this formalism. But the mere
admission that the rectangle constructed on two segments has some formal properties in
common with the product of two numbers (which is made clear by a number of propositions
of the Elements, especially from books II and VI) is not the same as the introduction of such
a formalism, though it certainly suggests a multiplicative language to be used to enunciate
these problems71. Hence, these problems can be enunciated in a language similar with that
used for writing polynomial equations, without being understood as algebraic problems in
Bos’ sense. Moreover, the uses of a similar language for enunciating these problems is in no
way a necessary condition for their solution. What is typical in these problems, however
they are enunciated, is rather that what it is sought is a geometrical magnitude that is
characterized and identified without relying on any diagram.
The second class of purely quantitative geometrical problems includes problems, de-
pending on certain positional relations, represented by appropriate diagrams that enter
into their formulation. These problems are purely quantitative insofar as it is possible, on
account of these diagrams, to reduce any relevant positional condition they are concerned
with to a quantitative one. This amounts to relying on diagrams for eliminating these
same diagrams, or at least for making them essentially useless, and thus transforming a
problem of the second class into a problem of the first one. All the examples Bos gives in
his book of what he calls “algebraic analysis” are of this sort, and stage A in his pattern
of algebraic method of problematic analysis and synthesis seems, indeed, to be concerned
with this process of elimination of diagrams, directly understood as a “derivation” of an
appropriate equation.
Vie`te’s main concern in the Zeteticorum libri was not however this process of elimination
of diagrams, but rather geometrical purely quantitative problems of the first class, or, more
generally, problems concerned with abstract quantities capable of expressing the common
forms of arithmetical and geometrical purely quantitative problems.
Now, according both to Vie`te’s method and to Bos’ pattern, the solution of these prob-
lems needs, at least in most cases, a second reduction occurring after the fulfillment of stage
A of this pattern. This is the fulfillment of stage A’. Once this stage is fulfilled, stage B
leads to the solution of the problem, by means of a classical geometrical construction or a
numerical calculation, suggested by the result obtained in stages A or A’. The procedure
that Bos describes as consisting of stages A-A’-B in his pattern can thus, more generally,
be described as a sequence of two reductions (a reduction of the problem to a system of
polynomial equations and a reduction of this system of equations to other equations or
to appropriate equalities or proportions72) and a geometrical construction or a numerical
calculation suggested by the result of the second reduction. Both in the case of geomet-
71Cf. the section 3, below.
72The centrality, in Vie`te’s method, of the reduction of the equations occurring in stage A into an
appropriate system of proportions has been largely emphasized by Giusti and Freguglia: cf. for example:
[26] , 73, [27],116-133 and [32].
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rical purely quantitative problems of the first class and that of problems concerned with
numbers or abstract quantities, the first reduction merely consists into the transcription
of the conditions of the problem in a new appropriate language. In these cases, what is
essential is thus the application of a twofold procedure consisting of a reduction followed by
a construction suggested by it: this is just an analysis followed by a synthesis. Of course,
in so far as it consists either of a geometrical construction or a numerical calculation, the
synthesis cannot be performed unless the nature of the quantities it is concerned with has
been determined. Thus, the procedure applies to problems concerned with abstract quan-
tities only if the nature of these quantities is unveiled at last. Suppose that the problem is
geometrical, or it has been finally interpreted as a geometrical one. The synthesis can then
be understood as the construction of an element of a certain geometrical configuration that
can be represented by a certain diagram (since in classical geometry, there is no construc-
tion without diagrams73). This diagram is thus a sort of geometrical and positional model
of a purely quantitative problem.
One should thus conclude that a geometrical purely quantitative problem, or a problem
concerned with abstract quantities finally interpreted as a geometrical problem, is solved,
through such a procedure, when a geometrical and positional model is found out and
an element of it is constructed starting from other elements which are supposed to be
given. This is similar to what is done in classical geometry to solve any purely quantitative
problem: one finds out a particular positional model for it and constructs the ungiven
elements of this model which correspond to the sought quantities of the problem. The
crucial question consists in choosing an appropriate model, possibly the more appropriate
one with respect to certain relevant criteria. When Bos’ pattern of algebraic method of
problematic analysis and synthesis is so generalized and referred to geometrical problems,
analysis enters it as an argument suggesting an appropriate choice of this model, namely
a reduction of the given problem to another problem: the problem of constructing the
unknown elements of this model.
Once this is admitted, my point reduces to the following claim: this reduction can be
73Cf. [53].
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performed, and in fact has been performed in pre-modern mathematics74, without appeal-
ing to Vie`te’s formalism or to any other analogous formalism relative to the operations
of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, root extraction and solving polynomial
equations defined on geometrical or abstract quantities. To justify this claim, I just have
to provide a more precise characterization of what I take as the non-Pappusian kind of
problematic analysis which is underlying Bos’ pattern, and present some examples of it.
2.2.3 Trans-configurational (problematic) analysis
A geometrical purely quantitative condition is, in the great majority of cases, concerned
with segments which are taken either as such or as sides of rectangles or parallelepipeds.
Though the respective sides of rectangles and parallelepipeds have to be placed in a mu-
tually appropriate position, this position is fixed beforehand and rectangles and paral-
74A recent book by R. Netz, somewhat anticipated by a previous paper of his [cf. respectively [47] and
[44], especially 43-45] is devoted to the “historical development of a single mathematical proposition” [cf.
ibid., 8] going from its first occurrence, under the form of a “problem”, in book II of Archimedes’ treatise
On the Sphere and the Cylinder, to its reformulation, under the form of an “equation”, in al-Khayya¯m’s
Treatise of Algebra [cf. the next footnote (85)]. Put in Archimedes’ terms, the question consists in cutting
a given segment AB in a point O, in such a way that, supposing that another segment AΓ and an “area”
∆ are given, the following proportion holds:
AO : AΓ = ∆ : Q(OB).
This is the question to which Archimedes reduces the proposition 4 of book II of his treatise: to cut a
sphere so that its segments are in a given ratio to each other. Netz shows how Archimedes’ solution is
largely dependent on this specific context, or, in his own words, how it is “embedded within a geometric
world, studying particular geometric configurations”, but he also notices that the complexity of the question
“demands a simplification that [. . . ] holds in it the germs of the abstract or indeed the algebraic” [cf. ibid.,
15-16]. The transition Netz is concerned with consists in the gradual flowering of these germs. This is
what he describes as a passage from a problem to an equation. Behind the obvious differences between
Netz’s approach, terminology, and historical concern, there is, I think, a fundamental convergence between
a number of his views and the considerations I shall develop in the following part of my paper. A symptom
of this convergence is Netz’s use of the terms “quantitative”, or even “purely quantitative”, in a sense that is
not far from mine. A symptom of our differences is the fact that Netz never refers these terms to problems,
speaking rather of (purely) quantitative thoughts, ways, relations, geometrical objects, or approaches [cf.
ibid., 35-38, 52-54, 64, 90, 97-98, 102-103, 107, 123]. A geometrical problem is in fact for him concerned as
such with objects “participating in local configurations, and [. . . ] manipulated to obtain relations within
such a local configuration” (notice that the term “configuration” refers here to a system of geometrical
objects satisfying certain positional relations, as it is represented by a particular diagram), whereas it is an
equation that is concerned with objects that “belong to more general structures, and are related to each
other in more general ways, independently of the local configuration they happen to be in” [cf. ibid., 29],
that is, as he says some pages later, with quantitative objects. It seems, instead, to me that a problem like
that of finding a point O which satisfies the previous proportion is, as such, purely quantitative, though it
can be interpreted on a specific geometrical model characterized by particular positional relations. On the
other hand, for me, a purely quantitative problem is far from being identified, as such, with an equation.
For it to be the case an appropriate formalism is needed.
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lelepipeds are geometrical quantities whose respective size depends only on the respective
size of these segments. Hence, there is no difficulty in admitting that a purely quantita-
tive condition can be concerned with the respective sides of rectangles or parallelepipeds.
The proposition XIII.1 of Euclid’s Elements, considered in section 2.1.1, provides a clear
example of a similar condition.
To prove it, Euclid refers to a diagram where the relevant rectangles take certain mutual
positions. The proof of the scholiast shows that this is not necessary75. Though it is
actually accompanied by a diagram , the function of such a diagram—which reduces to a
straight line DB on which two points, A and C, are taken, so that DA, AB, AC, CB, DC,
and the whole DB identifies with b, a, α, β, γ, and a + b, respectively—is simply that of
identifying the relevant segments, so as to fix the reference of the corresponding individual
constants76. The proof entirely depends on appropriate substitutions and already proved
theorems, which work in fact as rules of inference. Analysis goes in the same way. For
short, in my reconstruction I have expressed the conditions of the theorem by writing
“a = 2b”, “α+ β = a” and “a : α = α : β”, and used the symbols “R(−,−)” and “Q(−)”.
It is however easy to understand that if I had simply said, as Euclid and the scholiast
did77, that DA is the half of AB and the point C cuts AB in extreme and mean ratio, then
openly spoken of the rectangles and squares constructed on the different parts of DB, the
analysis and the synthesis would have proceeded in the same way, so as to prove that the
square constructed on DC is five times that constructed on DA. What is essential in the
argument of the scholiast is not the way in which the relevant segments and rectangles are
denoted and the relevant conditions expressed, but rather the fact that these segments and
rectangles are denoted and these conditions expressed in such a way that is possible to
apply appropriate theorems and operate appropriate substitutions.
In El.XIII.1, all segments are understood as being given (the segments α and β are
clearly supposed to have been actually constructed). It is clear, however, that the infer-
ences entering the scholiast’s arguments do not depend on that. Suppose that a purely
quantitative problem is addressed. Instead of representing its solution by a diagram, one
could act as the scholiast did in this case: simply denoting the given or ungiven quantities in
such a way that it is possible to refer to them a number of appropriate theorems and operate
appropriate substitutions. These theorems and substitutions might then be used to per-
form appropriate inferences, concerned with geometrical objects but completely indepen-
dent of their mutual positions—which I shall term, for short, “geometrical non-positional
inferences”—and transform the configuration of given and ungiven quantities into another
75The scholiast is even explicit on this matter: in cases of propositions XIII.1 and XIII.2, he claims that
his “analysis and synthesis” are “without diagram [α´
c
νευ καταγραϕη˜ς]”: cf. [23], IV, 199.1-2 and 200.11-12.
I thank F. Acerbi for having pointed out this point to me.
76For this function of diagrams in classical geometry, cf. [45], 19-26.
77Cf. footnote (53).
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configuration expressing a new problem whose solution appears to be simpler78. The ar-
gument so produced would certainly be an analysis, since the ungiven quantities would be
taken as if they were given. But this analysis would not be intra-configurational. As long
as it aims to transform the given configuration into a new one, it could rather be termed
“trans-configurational”79.
Consider the classical problem of the construction of two mean proportionals between
two given segments. To solve it, one could look for a positional model for this problem,
that is a particular geometrical situation involving four segments so mutually related as to
satisfy the two mean proportionals condition. Once such a configuration has been found,
the problem of the construction of two mean proportionals has been reduced to another
problem: that of constructing two of these four segments, starting from the two remaining
ones. To attain such a reduction one could suppose that the problem has already been solved
and that x and y are the sought segments, then remark that the continuous proportion
a : x = x : y = y : b (1)
among these segments and the two given segments a and b, may be split into two distinct
proportions
a : x = x : y and x : y = y : b, (2)
each of which provides the symptom of a parabola. It is possible that Menaechmus had
proceeded in a similar way to discover his second construction of two mean proportionals
by intersection of conics80, and it is actually in a similar way that Eutocius argues when
he exposes such a construction, observing that, because of condition (1), the rectangle
constructed on a and y and the rectangle constructed on b and x are respectively equal to
the squares constructed on x and on y, so that the point of orthogonal co-ordinates x and
y belongs to two parabolas81.
This argument—which leads from the problem of the construction of two mean propor-
tionals to the other problem of the construction of two parabolas—is certainly an analysis,
78According to Mahoney [cf. [43], 331], the analysis entering the scholiast’s argument relative to El.XIII.1
“illustrates the use of simplified algebra of line segments”, whose possible “application [. . . ] to problematic
analysis should be clear”. I do not know if, in Mahoney’s intentions, “the use of simplified algebra of line
segments” was close to what I understand as the performing of geometrical non positional inferences, but
it can certainly be so understood. In another, but similar vein, Netz [cf. [46], 155] has remarked that in
the Greek corpus, theorematic analysis “makes a departure from tradition, explicitly: it offers a solution
with less reliance upon the diagram than the original Euclidean proposition (claiming, indeed, not to rely
upon the diagram at all).” And continued by observing that “these proofs no longer rely upon geometrical
cut-and-paste techniques, but upon a more abstract manipulation of objects according to rules referring,
essentially, to the formulaic language.”
79Notice that I use here the term “configuration” to refer to a system of equalities or proportions, rather
than to a system of geometrical objects as it is represented by a diagram, like I do, instead, when I speak
of intra-configurational analysis.
80An analogous point has been made by Mahoney: cf. [43], 333.
81Cf. [7], III, 82-85 and [34], I, 251-255.
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since it is founded on the supposition that the sought segments are given, but it is not an
intra-configurational or Pappusian analysis. It does not rest on a diagram representing—
together with appropriate information concerned with its elements—the hypothetical con-
figuration of geometrical objects and data corresponding to the solution of the problem, and
does not lead to isolate in such a configuration, or in an extended one, a sub-configuration
which only consists of given objects and determines this entire configuration. Far from leav-
ing this configuration unaltered, it includes, as an essential part of it, the transformation of
such a configuration, the continuous proportion (1)82, into another configuration, the pair
of proportions (2). Its starting point is a certain relation between what is actually given
and what is only supposed to be given, whereas its final point is a different relation between
these same elements. It is not intra-configurational, it is rather trans-configurational83.
This example is very simple, since analysis merely consists in a nearly imperceptible
transformation, as the splitting of a continuous proportion into two distinct proportions,
and in the understanding of these proportions as the symptoms of two parabolas. The same
pattern can however involve more complicated and evident transformations relying, rather
than on an obvious property of proportions, on a quite larger toolbox including appropriate
geometrical theorems concerned with segments, rectangles and parallelepipeds, used as
82Cf. footnote (79).
83In [52], 401-410, I advanced a distinction similar to the present one, between intra-configurational and
trans-configurational analysis, but presented it in a quite different context and with a different language,
and argued for quite different theses. The distinction I advanced there had been suggested to me by
P. Ma¨empa¨a¨’s reformulation of Hintikka and Remes’ distinction between “directional sense” of analysis [cf.
[36], 11 and [37], 269] and “analysis of configurations” (or “figures”) [cf. [36], XIII, XV, ch. IV, 31-40 and
ch. VII, 70-83, and [37], 269]. Ma¨empa¨a¨’s reformulation goes as follows: “Pappus described analysis as the
reduction of a proposition to be solved or proved successively backward to its antecedents until arriving at a
proposition whose solution is known [. . . ]. Descartes’ methodological description of his algebraic method of
analysis introduced an important novelty with respect to Pappus’s description. Descartes said that analysis
serves to determine how the unknown quantities of a problem depend on the given ones. Instead of seeking
a deductive connection between the proposition to be solved or proved and propositions whose solution or
proof was known, Descartes sought to determine the dependencies of unknown quantities on the given ones.
This is the ‘configurational interpretation’ of analysis.” [cf. [42], 201 and 202]. More recently, M. Beaney has
distinguished among “three main modes of analysis [. . . ][which] may be realized and combined in a variety
of ways, in constituting specific conceptions or practices of analysis”: the “regressive”, the “resolutive or
decompositional”, and the “interpretative or transformative” [cf. [9], 55]. According to him, the first mode
“was seen as central” in “ancient Greek geometry” [cf. ibid.], while both the second and the third ones
clearly appear in Descartes’ geometry, where “problems can indeed [. . . ] be broken down into simpler
problems” [ibid., 60], and “the geometric problem is first ‘translated’ into the language of algebra and
arithmetic in order to solve it more easily” [ibid., 67]. It seems to me that the resolutive mode is typical
of a conception of analysis that, despite becoming very common in modern age, has little to do with the
Aristotelian conception, rather depending on the Aristotelian notion of διαι´ρεσις [cf. Physics, 184a, 16 -
184b, 14], a notion that is only implicitly and marginally evoked in Pappus’ definition [cf. [52], 396-398].
The transformative mode is instead typical of trans-configurational analysis, though the transformation
that is involved in such an analysis is more a transformation of the given problem than a transformation of
“the framework of interpretation” of analysis itself, as Beaney argues, instead [cf. [9], 67].
34
rules of inferences perfectly independent of the consideration of any diagram, and applied
together with appropriate substitutions. Books II and VI of the Elements provide an
essential part of this toolbox of theorems but, of course, they do not exhaust it. Moreover,
this pattern also complies with analytical arguments referred to numerical problems and
aiming to transform the conditions of these problems into other conditions, by using an
appropriate formalism relative to the operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication,
division, root extraction and solving polynomial equations.
Of course, both this formalism and geometrical non-positional inferences can also occur—
and actually occurred—in the context of arguments that cannot be understood as exam-
ples of trans-configuational analysis: either, locally, within intra-configurational analyses
or other sorts of arguments—side by side with inferences of a quite different nature—, or
within series of other similar inferences providing non analytical arguments84. But as my
aim is that of suggesting a sense that we could attribute to the term “algebra” in the con-
text of the title of Vie`te’s Opus, where “new algebra” is identified with “restored analysis”,
I am overall interested in examples of systematic use of such a formalism and of geometrical
non-positional inferences in the context of trans-configurational analysis, applied, in turn,
in a systematic way so as to solve purely quantitative problems.
3 Al-Khayya¯m’s art of algebra and al-muqa¯bala
Al-Khayya¯m’s Treatise of Algebra and Al-muqa¯bala85 provide such an example.
84A great part of the examples presented by Mahoney, in the second part of his [43], as well as Archimedes’,
Dionysodorus’ and Diocle’s solutions of the problem mentioned in footnote (74), and Eutocious’ additions
to them—discussed by Netz, in [47] —include geometrical non positional inferences. Moreover, according
to Mahoney [cf. [43]., 337], “as it developed [in Greek mathematics], [. . . ] analysis came to mean much
more that a simple process of reverse reasoning; it involved a steadily growing body of generally applicable
mathematical techniques by which a mathematician facing a new situation could reduce it to a recognizable
form of a known problem or problems.” Though insisting on this understanding of analysis as a body
of techniques for reducing problems to other problems, Mahoney does not distinguish, however, between
reductions obtained within an unaltered configuration, possibly extended and represented by an appropri-
ate diagram (due to the identification of an appropriate sub-configuration, starting from which the sought
objects can be constructed relying on known procedures), from reductions consisting in a change of con-
figuration. In other terms, he does not distinguish between intra-configurational and trans-configurational
analysis. Still, his examples suggest that Pappus’ Treasury (or Domain) of Analysis had contained instances
of problematic trans-configurational analysis, at least locally [cf. footnote (65)]. This is also the case of the
7th book of Pappus’ Collection itself: an example is given by the proposition VI.85, which is solved through
a problematic analysis including some geometric non-positional inferences.
85I refer here to Rashed’s edition and French translation of such a treatise (originally written, probably, in
the first part of the 12th century), offered in [64], 116-237. They are accompanied by an introduction, a rich
and detailed commentary and a reconstruction of the history of the text. All of these have been very useful
for me. An older edition, also accompanied by a French translation, had been given by Woepcke in 1851: cf.
[3]. Al-Khayya¯m’s treatise enters a very large, rich and diversified tradition which has been reconstructed,
in its different aspects and forms, in [59], specially ch. I.. Here, I shall limit myself to consider this treatise
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According to al-Khayya¯m, “the art of algebra and al-muqa¯bala” is an art aiming to solve
a certain class of problems, namely: to “determine unknown [quantities] both numerical
and geometrical”; these are particular sorts of purely quantitative problems which would be
expressed today by means of polynomial equations of first, second or third degree86. The
language used by Al-Khayya¯m is codified enough to express these problems as different
variants of a common form. But this form is not obviously the one of polynomial equations
written in Cartesian notation which we use today. Here are three examples, corresponding
respectively to problems that we would express by means of an equation of first, second
and third degree87:
A root is equal to a number.
A square plus a number are equal to some roots.
A cube plus some squares, plus some sides, are equal to a number.
What is sought is of course (the determination of) the “root” or the “side” which satisfy
these conditions. The correspondence between multiplication and construction of a rectan-
gle on two given segments being admitted, there would be no difficulty in transcribing the
enunciation of these problems under the form of a polynomial equation written in Vie`te’s or
Descartes’ symbolic language, at least if the terms “squares” and “cubes” were understood
in their usual geometrical sense. But this would certainly not be enough for warranting
the possibility of solving these problems through a method which complies with Bos’ pat-
tern of algebraic method of problematic analysis and synthesis. The applicability of such
a method depends, indeed, not only on the possibility of rephrasing the conditions of the
problem in a similar language, but also, and above all, on the availability of a formalism
connected with this language to be applied, together with appropriate constructive clauses,
in order to achieve the stages A’ and B. Hence, a similar method applies to the solution of
al-Khayya¯m’s problems only if they are immersed in a mathematical context characterized
by the availability of Vie`te’s formalism, or of an equivalent one. This context was not
as such, by emphasizing the crucial role that trans-configurational analysis takes in it.
86Cf. [64], 116-120: “One of the notions we need in the part of knowledge which is known under the
name of mathematics is the art of algebra and al-muqa¯bala, intended to determine unknown [quantities]
both numerical and geometrical. [. . . ] the art of algebra and al-muqa¯bala is a scientific art whose object is
absolute number and measurable magnitudes in as far as they are unknown but related to a known thing
through which they can be determined [. . . ].” Al-Khayya¯m seems thus to admit that the art of algebra
and al-muqa¯bala is a sort of auxiliary art for arithmetic and geometry. On the meaning of “algebra and
al-muqa¯bala” in the technical language of Arabic mathematics, cf. [18], III, 102-104. These terms were
first used, in their technical sense, by al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s [cf. [38]] to denote two procedures (or operations)
used to simplify an appropriate equality (by adding or subtracting equal terms to its two members), or
more generally the systems of operations to be applied in order to reduce the condition of an equation-like
problem to its standard form.
87Cf. [64], 128-129, 140-141 and 184-185.
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of course al-Khayya¯m’s. Moreover, to state a condition like “a square plus a number are
equal to some roots” was not for him the same as giving a mathematical object, as it is
the case when a polynomial equation is presented in the context of Vie`te’s formalism88.
Thus, in order to avoid any sort of possible misunderstanding, I shall refer to al-Khayya¯m’s
problems by the quite cumbersome expression “equation-like problems”, rather than by the
term “equation” alone, which is used in contrast in Rashed’s translation89.
These problems are presented by stating appropriate conditions under the form of equal-
ities involving: “a number”; “a side”, “some sides”, “a root”, or “some roots” (in a single
occasion al-Khayya¯m says “some things”90); “a square” or “some squares”; and “a cube”91.
Despite the term al-Khayya¯m uses to denote it, a number is a given quantity, that is, ei-
ther a given number in the proper arithmetical sense of this term92, or a given geometrical
quantity, namely a segment, a rectangle or a parallelepiped. A side or root is an unknown
quantity to be determined, that is either an unknown number or an unknown segment. A
square is either the second power of the root or side (if this is a number) or a geometrical
square constructed on this root or side (if this is a segment). Analogously, a cube is either
the third power of the root or side (if this is a number), or a geometrical cube constructed
on this root or side (if this is a segment). When the root or side is a number, then for “some
88The aim that Vie`te pursued in his [79] seems to have been just that of warranting the possibility of
understanding an equation as a mathematical object, rather than, merely, as the condition of a problem. I
thank C. Alvarez for having attracted my attention on this matter.
89The term “equation” is also used by Netz in his [47], where it is explicitly opposed to the term “problem”
[cf. footnote (74)]. This is only an example of the differences between my reading of al-Khayya¯m’s treatise
and that of Netz. These differences certainly rely, for a great part, on the emphasis we bestow upon different
aspects of such a treatise, but also concern the general interpretation of it. Netz seems to consider that it
relies on equations (rather than problems) as long as it “downplays geometry” [cf. ibid., 182] and that this
goes together with its use of equalities (rather than proportions), its systematic nature and its generality
[cf. ibid., 182-186]. For him, al-Khayya¯m “opens up the possibility of considering his objects symbolically,
as elements manipulated by the rules of calculation, yet essentially conceives of them as components in
a geometric configuration” [cf. ibid, 163-164]. For me, al-Khayya¯m’s objects are, without any ambiguity,
numbers or geometrical magnitudes, though he adopts a general language to speak of the common form of
certain problems (the equation-like problems) that pertain to them. Al-Khayya¯m’s generality concerns thus
for me more his language than his objects. Moreover, though I do not deny that his approach is systematic,
I do not think that this situates him beyond geometry. When Al-Khayya¯m’s equation-like problems are
interpreted on segments, they are genuine geometrical problems, and the systematic use of geometrical non
positional inferences does not go together with the admission that these inferences concern “more abstract
objects” [ibid., 164], as Netz claims, instead.
90Cf. [64], 134-135 : “Some things are equal to a cube.”
91Al-Khayya¯m speaks of one or more roots when the problem does not involve a cube or can be reduced
to a problem that does not involve a cube (it is an equation-like problem of first or second degree), while
he speaks of one or more sides when the problem does involve a cube and cannot be reduced to a problem
that does not involve a cube (it is an equation-like problem of third degree). The reason is quite clear: he
is able to solve the problems of this latter class only when they are interpreted geometrically.
92From now on, I shall use the term “number” only in its proper arithmetical sense, unless it appears in
a quotation from al-Khayya¯m.
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roots”, “some sides”, or “some squares”, al-Khayya¯m understands other numbers obtained
by taking this number or its second power a certain number of times. When the root or side
is a segment, the meaning of these expressions is variant. If the problem involves a cube,
then it never involves a square or a root or a side, but always “some squares” and/or “some
roots” or “some squares”. The term “some squares” is then used to denote a parallelepiped
whose base is the square constructed on the root or side and whose altitude is obtained
by taking a certain number of times a given segment supposed to be unitary, while the
terms “some roots” or “some sides” are used to denote a parallelepiped whose altitude is
the root or side and whose base is obtained by taking a certain number of times a square
constructed on a given segment supposed to be unitary. If the problem does not involve
a cube, but it involves a square, then it never involves a root or a side, but always “some
roots” or “some sides”. The terms “some roots” or “some sides” are then used to denote a
rectangle whose base is the root or side and whose altitude is obtained by taking a certain
number of times a given segment supposed to be unitary. Finally, in the only case where
the problem does involve neither a cube, nor a square, it involves a root.
This language is in fact quite a sophisticated tool used to express the common forms
of arithmetical and geometrical equation-like problems. Al-Khayya¯m’s treatise is about all
the possible forms of numerical and geometrical equation-like problems of the first three
degrees. It aims to classify these different forms and to show how these problems can be
systematically solved.
A classificatory criterion concerns the numbers of addenda entering the equalities which
express the conditions of the problems. This comes to distinguish two-addenda, three-
addenda and four-addenda problems. After the general conditions characterizing al-Khayya¯m’s
equation-like problems, a two-addenda problem can take six different forms, a three-
addenda problem can take twelve different forms, and finally a four-addenda problem can
take seven different forms. Hence, one has twenty-five possible different forms. These forms
can belong, in turn, to three classes: that of problems which involve neither a square nor a
cube, or that can be reduced to problems like these (the equation-like problems of the first
degree); that of problems which do not involve a cube, involving instead a square, or that
can be reduced to problems like these (the equation-like problems of the second degree);
and finally that of problems which do involve a cube (the equation-like problems of the
third degree).
This produces a threefold classification which is only concerned with the form of the
equality expressing the condition of the problem. If we use our notations to express this
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form, we can illustrate it by means of the following schema93:
2 addenda 3 addenda 4 addenda
1st
class
[1] x = c
[4] x2 = px
[6] x3 = qx2
2nd
class
[2] x2 = c
[5] x3 = px
[7] x2 + px = c
[8] x2 + c = px
[9] x2 = px+ c
[10] x3 + qx2 = px
[11] x3 + px = qx2
[12] x3 = qx2 + px
3nd
class
[3] x3 = c
[13] x3 + px = c
[14] x3 + c = px
[15] x3 = px+ c
[16] x3 + px2 = c
[17] x3 + c = qx2
[18] x3 = qx2 + c
[19] x3 + qx2 + px = c
[20] x3 + qx2 + c = px
[21] x3 + px+ c = qx2
[22] x3 = qx2 + px+ c
[23] x3 + qx2 = px+ c
[24] x3 + px = qx2 + c
[25] x3 + c = px+ qx2
where x is the root or side, c is a given quantity, p and q are numbers, and the numbers in
brackets indicate the species (in the order in which al-Khayya¯m considers them).
These notations are however essentially foreign to al-Khayya¯m. The language I have
described above is precisely used, instead of it, to express the common forms respected
by any problem of any species, independently of the fact that it is an arithmetical or a
geometrical problem. It is thus a common language for arithmetic and geometry. Take
the species [19]. The formula used by al-Khayya¯m to characterize it is: “a cube plus
some squares, plus some sides are equal to a number”. It refers both: to an arithmetical
equality, where the third power of an unknown number x, plus the second powers of x
taken a certain number q of times, plus x taken a certain numbers p of times are supposed
to be equal to a given number c; and to a geometrical equality where the cube constructed
on an unknown segment x, let say C (x), plus the parallelepiped constructed on the square
constructed on x and on a given segment, supposed to be unitary, taken a certain number
q of times, let say P (x, x, qu) = q [P (x, x, u)], plus the parallelepiped constructed on x and
on a rectangle constructed on the unitary segment and on this same unitary segment taken
a certain number p of times, let say P (x, u, pu) = p [P (x, u, u)], are supposed to be equal
to a parallelepiped constructed on a given segment c and on the square constructed on the
unitary segment, let say P (u, u, c).
93My schema slightly differs from the one given by Rashed [cf. [64], 11], but it is suggested by it.
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Al-Khayya¯m’s common language for arithmetic and geometry does not go together with
a common method or a number of common methods to solve equation-like problems inde-
pendently of their particular nature, however. Thus, when he passes from the classification
of his problems to their solution, he is forced to distinguish between the two possible in-
terpretations of his language. In the case of the geometrical interpretation, Al-Khayya¯m
is able to associate to any species of his problems a method of solution that applies to any
problem of this species. It is not the same, of course, for the arithmetical interpretation,
since al-Khayya¯m did not know how to solve the arithmetical equation-like problems of the
third class.
At the beginning of the present section, I have said what al-Khayya¯m claims “the art of
algebra and al-muqa¯bala” to be, for him. Still, this is a quite vague characterization. The
previous general presentation of al-Khayya¯m’s treatise makes us able to advance a prelimi-
nary characterization of what this treatise is about, which should count as a more precise—
though still preliminary—characterization of what the art of algebra and al-muqa¯bala was
for its author. This was for him a mathematical art aiming at: i) expressing the common
form of equation-like problems both numerical and geometrical; ii) classifying these prob-
lems; iii) showing how these problems can be systematically solved. It would thus be an
art serving both arithmetic and geometry94. Still, this art should in no way be understood
as a unitary theory of quantities. It was a system of techniques, rather than a theory. And
it was common rather than unitary95: although it was employing a common language to
speak of numbers and geometrical quantities, it was not a general context within which
inferences concerning numbers and geometrical quantities could be warranted and things
about them asserted. This common language was used to express the common forms of cer-
tain arithmetical and geometrical problems and to classify them, but when these problems
had to be solved such a language was interpreted either arithmetically or geometrically96.
In order to detail this preliminary characterization of al-Khayya¯m’s art of algebra and
al-muqa¯bala, we should consider his solutions of equation-like problems. I shall limit myself
94Cf. above, footnote (86). It seems thus that, according to al-Khayya¯m, the art of algebra and al-
muqa¯bala was not opposed to geometry, being rather an art common to arithmetic and geometry. Other
Arabic mathematicians, like Tha¯bit Ibn Qurra, seemed, instead, to speak of algebra as an arithmetic art and
compare “the method of [the] solution [of al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s problems] through geometry” to “the method of
their solution through algebra”, though admitting that these methods agree with each other [cf. [41], 108].
Tha¯bit’s attitude seems to me analogous to that of many early-modern mathematicians, like Cardan or
Bombelli: cf. footnotes (8) and (25).
95Cf. the section 1.
96The following passage—where al-Khayya¯m betokens not to be able to solve numerical equation-like
problems of third degree—is particularly clear on this respect [cf. [64], 124]: “But when the object of the
problem is an absolute number, neither I nor any other man of this art has succeeded in the solution of these
species but for the first three degrees, that are the number, the thing, and the square; perhaps someone else
who will follow us will be able to do it. And I shall often point out the numerical proofs of what is possible
to prove starting from Euclid’s work. Mind that the geometrical proof of these methods does not dispense
you from the numerical proof if the object is a number and not a measurable magnitude.”
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to consider three examples, respectively concerned with problems of species 7, 16, and 22.
By considering the second of these examples, I shall come en passant to the problems of
species 3.
3.1 First example: “A square plus ten of its roots are equal to thirty
nine in number”
This97 is one of the few cases where al-Khayya¯m considers a particular example of equation-
like problems of the species he is concerned with. This is given by the choice of the number
ten as the numerical coefficient for roots and of the number thirty nine for the given
quantity. This is just al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s example for the case where “roots and squares are
equal to numbers” and just one square is considered98. If al-Khayya¯m comes back to it, it
is merely to stay close to the tradition. His solution is, indeed, completely independent of
the choice of the numbers ten and thirty nine and hold for any problem of species 7.
Al-Khayya¯m begins by presenting al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s arithmetical solution, which is, for
him, the general solution of such a species of problems when they are interpreted as numer-
ical ones. When these problems are interpreted as geometrical ones, this solution does not
apply and a different, properly geometrical, solution has to be provided. It has to display
an appropriate construction of a segment x such that:





where p and n are any numbers, a, b and u are three given segments, the last of which is
supposed to be unitary, and for any segments α and β, “Q(α)” and “R(α, β)” denote the
square constructed on α and the rectangle constructed on α and β, respectively.
Al-Khayya¯m presents two distinct arguments. The second is the same as al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s





ibn Qurra’s one100 and can be reconstructed as follows101:
Suppose that x were given.
Then Q(x), R(a, x) and Q(x) +R(a, x)
would be given, too.
A.1








and R(b, u) are given. A.3
























As a matter of fact, al-Khayya¯m refers to a dia-
gram (fig. 3), but he does not rely on it in his argu-
ment. Like that accompanying the scholiast’s proof
of El.XIII.1102, such a diagram is merely of use for
identifying the relevant segments and fixing the ref-
erence of the corresponding individual constants103:
the segments AD, DE and DG identify with x, a
and a2 respectively, so that the square ADCB and
the rectangles DEFC and AEFB identify with Q(x),
R(a, x), and Q(x) + R(a, x), respectively (step A.1 in my reconstruction corresponds to
such an identification). No square which would identify with Q(z) is drawn. It is thus
clear that the equality which occurs in step A.4 and constitutes the essential step of the
100Cf. [41], 105-106.
101Here is how al-Khayya¯m’s expresses himself [cf. [64], 136-137]: “Let us suppose that the square AC
[fig. 3] plus ten of its roots is equal to thirty-nine in number. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that ten
of its roots are equal to the rectangle CE; the straight line DE is thus ten. Cut it in half at G. Since we
have cut the straight line DE in half at G, and we have added AD on its prolongation, the product of EA
and AD, that is equal to the rectangle BE, plus the square of DG, are equal to the square of GA; now the
square of DG, that is the half of the number of roots, is known, and the rectangle BE, that is the given
number, is known; the square of GA is thus known, and the straight line GA is known. If one takes away
GD, it remains AD, known.” Al-Khayya¯m then presents another solution, corresponding to al-Khwa¯rizmı¯’s
well-known geometrical proof [cf. [38], 13-16].
102Cf. section 2.1.1 and p. 32.
103Of course, al-Khayya¯m does not use the letters “a”, “b”, “u”, “x” and “z”, and the symbols “Q (−)”
and “R (−,−)” to denote the segments, squares and rectangles he is concerned with. He rather refers to
them as those represented by his diagram.
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argument, is not deduced based on the diagram, but rather through El.II.4 used as a rule
of inference, so that this step consists in fact in a geometrical non-positional inference.
Al-Khayya¯m’s argument is clearly an analysis, and it is namely a trans-configurational
analysis. It relies on such an inference to transform the configuration corresponding to the
conditions of the problem into a new configuration corresponding to a new and essentially
simpler problem: that of constructing a segment z such that




















2 and on the segment t satisfying the condition
a
2
: b = u : t (5)
(which is but a fourth proportional). Then, according to El.VI.17, one should seek the
segment z satisfying the condition
a
2




(which is but a mean proportional). Because of the equality z = x+ a2 , the sought root of
the original problem will then be:
x = z − a
2
. (7)
Like the scholiast’s proof of El.XIII.1, this last argument relies on a number of Euclid’s
theorems that make useless the consideration of any diagram. But, being a construction,
rather than a deduction, it does not use these theorems as rules of inference. Rather, it uses
them, so to say, as rules of constructive calculation. Notice however that al-Khayya¯m does
not make the synthesis explicit. He concludes his solution by observing that since Q(a2 )
and R(b, u) are both known, Q(z) is known, and then z is known, so that also x is known.
Hence, his solution is not properly a synthesis, but rather a reduction obtained thanks to
a trans-configurational analysis. Once this reduction is obtained, the construction of the
sought segment—that is, the synthesis—is so easy that it is left to the reader.
3.2 Second example: “A cube plus some square are equal to a number”
These104 are problems of the third class, and thus al-Khayya¯m is not able to solve them un-
der an arithmetical interpretation. Hence, he directly supposes that they are geometrically
104Cf. [64], 170-175.
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interpreted, so that the solution has to display an appropriate construction of a segment x
such that:





where q and n are any numbers, a, c and u are three given segments, the last of which is
supposed to be unitary, and for any segments α, β, and γ, “C(α)” and “P (α, β, γ)” denote
the cube constructed on α and the parallelepiped constructed on α, β, and γ, respectively.
To get this solution, al-Khayya¯m’s relies on the first of three lemmas that he had
proved before. This105 is lemma 1, and states the second of Menaechmus’ constructions of
two mean proportionals, which depends on the intersection of two parabolas106. This is
actually equivalent to the solution of geometrical equation-like problems of species 3: “A
cube is equal to a number107”. To get it, al-Khayya¯m remarks that the equality
C(x) = P (c, u, u) ; [c = nu] , (9)
—providing the condition for these problems—is equivalent to the proportion
Q(u) : Q(x) = x : c (10)
(since, according to El.XI.34, cubes whose bases are inversely proportional to their altitudes
are equal), which follows, in turn, from the continuous proportion
u : x = x : y = y : c. (11)
(since: if u : x = x : y, then Q(u) : Q(x) = u : y, for El.VI.17 and El.VI.1; and, if
u : x = y : c, then u : y = x : c, for El.V.16).
Hence, lemma 1 establishes how to construct a cube equal to a given parallelepiped. This
is just the first step of al-Khayya¯m’s solution of problems corresponding to the condition
(8). This solution can be reconstructed as follows:
105Cf. [64], 152-157.
106Cf. the note (81) above.
107Cf. [64], 160-161. As a matter of fact, Al-Khayya¯m’s solutions of equation-like problems of the third
class are ingenious generalizations of such a solution.
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The segment a is given; take AB equal to it (fig. 4). Sol.1
By lemma 1, construct a segment h,
such that C(h) = P (c, u, u).
Sol.2
Thus h is given. On the straight line AB, take BI
equal to h, and construct on it the square BCDI.
Sol.3
Construct the hyperbola NDE passing
through D with asymptotes BC and BI.
Sol.4
Construct the parabola AEK with
latus rectus BC, axis AB and vertex A.
Sol.5
From the point of intersection E of these conics
trace the perpendicular EG to the straight line AB.
Sol.6
The segment BG is the sought side. Sol.7











108Al-Khayya¯m also proves by reductio ad absurdum that the two conics actually intersect for any choice
of a and h: cf. the footnote (110) below.
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The point E belongs to the parabola AEK,
thus: AG : EG = EG : BC.
P .1
The point E belongs to the hyperbola AEK,
thus: EG : BC = BC : BG.
P.2
One then gets the continuous proportion:
AG : EG = EG : BC = BC : BG.
P.3
And, from here, the equality:
C (BC) = P (AG,BG,BG) = C (BG) + P (AB,BG,BG).
P.4
By posing BG = x, this equality just reduces to
C (h) = C (x) + P (a, x, x),
which, for Sol.2, is equivalent to condition (8).
P.5
If one would admit that the argument Sol.1-7 were a synthesis, this solution and this
proof would perfectly correspond to stages B and C of Bos’ pattern of algebraic method of
problematic analysis and synthesis. Al-Khayya¯m says nothing, however, either about the
construction of the two conics entering this argument or about the construction of the two
parabolas mentioned in lemma 1. I shall come back later to the reason for this choice109.
For the time being, let me remark that insofar as al-Khayya¯m does not make explicit how
to construct his conics, his solution is not properly a synthesis. From this point of view, his
argument is quite similar to that concerning geometrical equation-like problems of species
7 which I have considered in the previous section: in both cases, al-Khayya¯m hints at how
to construct the sought segment, but as a matter of fact he does not actually construct
it; he actually reduces the given problem to another one, which is left to the reader to
solve. But, whereas in the case of geometrical equation-like problems of species 7 such a
reduction is obtained by means of an explicit trans-configurational analysis, in the present
case this stage is lacking. All al-Khayya¯m does is to describe how it would be possible to
obtain a certain segment, supposing that one were able to construct four particular conics,
and to prove that this segment is just the one being sought. Nevertheless, one could ask:
how is it possible to pass from the given problem to such a description, which is actually
the description of the solution of another problem (which is proved to be equivalent to the
given one only afterwards)? The answer seems to me quite obvious: this is done by means
of a trans-configurational analysis that, according to a classical habit, al-Khayya¯m does
not make explicit. It is still easy to reconstruct this analysis by turning our attention to
109Cf. the section 3.4.
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the proof. It goes as follows:
Consider the condition (8), and according to
the lemma 1, replace in it the parallelepiped
P (c, u, u) with a cube C(h), so as to get the new
equality C(x) + P (a, x, x) = C(h),
where the segments a and h are both given.
A.1
Suppose that x were given. The cube C(x) and the
parallelepiped P (a, x, x), could then be added
so as to get the new equality P (a+ x, x, x) = C(h),
whose two terms would be given.
A.2
This equality follows from the proportions
x : h = h : y and h : y = y : a+ x.
A.3
These are respectively the symptoms of an hyperbola
subtending the square Q(h),
and a parabola of latus rectus h, whose axis coincides
with an asymptote of the hyperbola and whose vertex
is at a distance a from the centre of the hyperbola
A.4
Like the scholiast’s proof of El.XIII.1, this argument includes nothing but geometrical
non-positional inferences. It is a twofold trans-configurational analysis: its first part is
composed of steps A.1-2 and reduces the problem of seeking a segment x satisfying the
condition (8) to the problem of seeking a segment x satisfying the condition P (a+x, x, x) =
C(h); its second part is composed of steps A.3-5 and reduces this latter problem to the
problem of constructing the point of intersection of two conics. The first part relies on the
replacement, in a purely quantitative condition, of a parallelepiped with a cube (licensed
by lemma 1) and of a sum of a cube and a parallelepiped with another parallelepiped. The
second part relies on El.XI.36 and El.XI.37, which license the transformation of an equality
between a cube and a parallelepiped into a pair of proportions which are then understood
as the symptoms of two conics. What al-Khayya¯m explicitly presents is nothing but a
description of these two conics followed by a proof of the equivalence of the given problem
and the problem of constructing their point of intersection.
Mutatis mutandis, this is the general scheme of al-Khayya¯m’s arguments concerning
all equation-like problems of the third class: these problems are directly interpreted as
geometrical problems; an hidden trans-configurational analysis reduces each of them to the
problem of constructing the point of intersection of two conics; these conics are described—
without making explicit how they could be effectively constructed—and the equivalence of
the former and the latter problem is proved110. By passing from three-addenda to four-
110In some cases, al-Khayya¯m explicitly proves that his conics actually intersect for any choice of the given
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addenda problems, the hidden trans-configurational analysis and the proof of equivalence
of the two problems become of course a little more complicated. The next example should
make clear how the former works.
3.3 Third example: “A number plus some sides plus some squares are
equal to a cube”
This111 is also a species of problems of the third class. Once they are interpreted as
geometrical problems, their solution has to display an appropriate construction of a segment
x such that:






where p, q and n are any numbers and a, b, c and u are three given segments, the last of
which is supposed to be unitary.
In this case al-Khayya¯m does not distinguish explicitly the description of the relevant
conics from the proof of the equivalence of the given problem and the problem of construct-
ing this point. Still, his argument is clearly twofold. For short, I limit myself to exposing
al-Khayya¯m’s hidden trans-configurational analysis, which is easy to reconstruct from the
second part of this argument.
Both this analysis and the argument which al-Khayya¯m explicitly exposes make use
of the second of the three lemmas which he proves before passing from problems of the
second class to problems of the third one. This112 is lemma 2, and consists in describing
how to construct a parallelepiped whose base is a given square and which is supposed to be
equal to a given parallelepiped whose base is also a square. This reduces to the successive
construction of two fourth proportionals113. Once such a lemma is admitted, the analysis
segment entering the condition of the given problem or indicates under which conditions they intersect; in
some other cases, he does not face this question. A complete treatment of it will be done some time later
by Sharaf al-Dı¯n al Tu¯s¯ı: cf. [64], 26 and [2], t. I.
111Cf. [64], 198-201.
112Cf. [64], 156-159.
113This is how al-Khayya¯m reasons. Supposing that both a parallelepiped P (α, α, β) and a square Q(γ) are
given, one can construct a segment µ such that α : γ = γ : µ and then a segment ν such that µ : α = β : ν.
If this is done, ν and β are inversely proportional to Q(γ) and Q(α), and so: P (γ, γ, ν) = P (α, α, β).
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goes as follows:
Consider the condition (12), and replace in it
the parallelepiped P (b, u, x) with another
parallelepiped P (k, k, x) (i. e. the rectangle
R(b, u) with the square Q(k)), and, according
to the lemma 2, the parallelepiped P (c, u, u)
with another parallelepiped P (k, k, h),
so as to get the new equality
P (k, k, h) + P (k, k, x) + P (a, x, x) = C(x),
where the segments a, k, and h are given.
A.1
Suppose that x were given. It would be such that
a ≤ x, since P (a, x, x) ≤ C(x). Suppose that
x = a+ (x− a), where x− a is a segment that
is supposed to be given, and split the cube C(x)
into the two parallelepipeds P (a, x, x)
and P (x, x, x− a), in order to get the equality
P (k, k, h) + P (k, k, x) + P (a, x, x) = P (x, x, a) + P (x, x, x− a),
whose terms would all be given.
A.2
This equality reduces to the other one
P (k, k, h) + P (k, k, x) = P (x, x, x− a),
where the parallelepipeds entering the left-side
member can be easily added so as to get the
new equality P (k, k, h+ x) = P (x, x, x− a),
whose two terms would be given.
A.3
This equality is equivalent to the proportion
Q(k) : Q(x) = x− a : h+ x. A.4
As the segments a and h are given and the segment x
has been supposed to be given, this would also
be the case of the segment y such that
Q(y) : Q(h+ x) = x− a : h+ x.
A.5
The comparison of the two proportions occurring in
A.4 and A.5 provides the new proportion
Q(k) : Q(x) = Q(y) : Q(h+ x),
which easily reduces first to k : x = y : h+ x
and then to k : y − k = x : h.
A.6
The proportions occurring in A.5 and A.6 are
respectively the symptoms of two equilateral
hyperbolas, the first having both its
latus rectus and latus traversus equal to
h+ a, and the second subtending
the rectangle R(h, k).
A.7
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In modern formalism, these hyperbolas are respectively defined by the equations
y2 − x2 = x (h− a)− ha and x (y − k) = kh, (13)
which easily derive from the proportions












To solve the problem it is enough to construct these hyperbolas in an appropriate
relative position and to project their point of intersection on to a common axis. Thus al-
Khayya¯m first constructs the rectangle ABEF (fig. 5) on the segments AB = h and BE = k,
and takes the segment BC = a on the straight line AB ; then he constructs, on the straight
lines FE and BE, a rectangle EGHM, equal to ABEF and opposite to it in position; and
finally, he states that the first hyperbola is the equilateral one (of centre O, such that
AO = OC) whose vertices are the points A and C, and the second is the (equilateral) one
which subtends the rectangle EGHM (and whose centre is E). These hyperbolas intersect
in the point A and in another point I, which is of course the only one that al-Khayya¯m
considers, and whose projection N on the axis AC gives the side x = BN which was sought.
As well as in the previous case, al-Khayya¯m’s solution is thus a reduction justified
by a hidden trans-configurational analysis which, without referring to any diagram and
relying on nothing but appropriate geometrical non-positional inferences, transforms the
condition of the given problem into another equivalent condition which is easy to satisfy
by constructing two conics, whose actual construction is left to the reader. Such a trans-
configurational analysis is, once again, composed of two parts. Steps A.1-3 reduce the
problem of seeking a segment x satisfying the condition (12) to the problem of seeking a
segment x satisfying the condition P (k, k, h + x) = P (x, x, x− a); steps A.4-7 reduce this
latter problem to the problem of constructing the point of intersection of two hyperbolas.
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3.4 The aims of the art
The previous three examples should be enough to illustrate the nature and role of trans-
configurational analysis in al-Khayya¯m’s treatise. There is however an essential difference
between the first example and the other two. It concerns the nature of the construction that
al-Khayya¯m leaves to the reader, that is properly, the synthesis. While in the first example
this construction can be easily performed by ruler and compass, this is not the case for the
second and the third example. Thus a question arises: is al-Khayya¯m justified in avoiding
any consideration concerned with the actual construction of the effective solution of his
problems?
During his treatment of equation-like problems of species 21, al-Khayya¯m mentions
en passant a mathematician who had lived in the final part of the 10th century: Abu¯
al-Sahl al-Qu¯h¯ı. He is the author of a Treatise on the Perfect Compass, probably the
first one of a number of treatises composed some time before al-Khayya¯m’s and devoted
to the description and study of a mechanical tool to be used to trace continuously any
sort of conics114. This is a three-dimensional compass with a sliding drawing point which
is possible to regulate in different ways. In his treatise, al-Qu¯h¯ı shows how to do it, in
order to trace any conic. By following his instructions, one can easily trace all the conics
entering al-Khayya¯m’s solutions of his equation-like problems of the third class. Hence,
their construction is, from al-Khayya¯m’s point of view, not only easy, but also thoroughly
standard.
There is thus a very simple reason one could evoke in order to justify al-Khayya¯m’s
choice to leave to the reader the constructions providing the effective solution of his prob-
lems: once these problems have been reduced to other ones, there would have been no
interest in detailing such a construction. Still, it seems to me that this reason might go
together with another one: al-Khayya¯m was not understanding this construction as being
included in the subject-matter of his treatise, that is, he was supposing that it falls outside
the domain of art of algebra and al-muqa¯bala, in so far as he was understanding this art
as being concerned more with the reduction of equation-like problems to other problems
than to the solution of these problems. The third clause entering my previous preliminary
characterization of what the art of algebra and al-muqa¯bala was for al-Khayya¯m’s should
thus be made more precise: to show how equation-like problems can be systematically
solved is not the same as solving them. It seems thus that for al-Khayya¯m, the art of al-
gebra and al-muqa¯bala was a mathematical art aiming at: i) expressing the common form
of equation-like problems both numerical and geometrical; ii) classifying these problems;
iii) reducing them to other problems that one knew how to solve. Trans-configurational
analysis was the means used to attain the third of these aims.
114Cf. [84], and [1], 158-178. On the perfect compass and the question of the continuous tracing of conics
in the 10th century, cf. also: [60], LXXXI-LXXXII, [61], and [62], 46-118 and 229-291.
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4 Algebra and trans-configurational analysis
Of course, I do not want to argue that al-Khayya¯m’s treatise directly influenced Vie`te or
some other early-modern mathematicians. A copy of such a treatise was brought to Europe
by Golius around 1630115, but it is very difficult to know if it was read, and if so by whom;
and it is even more difficult to establish if European mathematicians at the end of the 16th
and at the very beginning of the 17th century were acquainted with it. Still, I suggest that
what Vie`te meant with “algebra” in the title of his Opus has much to do with al-Khayya¯m’s
art of algebra and al-muqa¯bala.
Namely, I suggest that Vie`te was referring to the art of transforming purely quantitative
conditions using either an appropriate formalism relative to the operations of addition, sub-
traction, multiplication, division, root extraction and solving polynomial equations applied
to indeterminate numbers, or appropriate geometrical non-positional inferences. This was
a system of techniques underlying trans-configurational analysis, though it was more than
that (since both this formalism and these inferences were also occurring in the context of
other sort of arguments116). The analogies between such a formalism and the properties of
rectangles and parallelepipeds that warranted such inferences were well known and largely
exploited before Vie`te. But they had never led to the definition of a new formalism rela-
tive to abstract quantities to be used to conduct trans-configurational analyses concerned
with purely quantitative problems, independently of their interpretation as numerical or
geometrical problems. In the Isagoge, Vie`te defined such a formalism and proposed to use
it for reforming the method of problematic analysis and synthesis. It is thus quite natural
to imagine that by speaking of algebra as an old art, in title of his Opus, he was referring
to a similar system of techniques that he was aiming to unify and develop within a new
methodological context.
An example taken from Vie`te’s Zeteticorum libri can be used to show how Vie`te’s
arguments are structurally similar to al-Khayya¯m’s ones. It concerns the zeteticum II.17:
“Data differentia laterum, & differentia cuborum: invenire latera”.
Vie`te denotes with “B” the difference of sides and with “D” the difference of cubes. He
does not denote the sides by any letter (calling them respectively the “greater side” and the
“smaller side”), but rather denotes by “E” their sum. To use more familiar symbols, let us
write “z”, instead, and denote the sides with “x” and “y”. In our notation, the problem
consists in solving the system of equations{
x− y = B
x3 − y3 = D , (15)
115Cf. [64], 17 and 109-110.
116A vivid illustration of the common use of geometrical non positional inferences among Arabic mathe-
maticians starting from the 9th century is offered by Rashed and Houzel’s recent edition of a collection of
geometrical propositions by Na‘¯ım ibn Mu¯sa¯, a quite modest mathematician whose work seems to reflect
the common mathematical culture of the period in Bagdad: cf. [63] and [54].
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where B and D are given. From the position x+ y = z, it follows
z +B = 2x ; z −B = 2y, (16)
and






As the side is given when the square is given, the problem is thus reduced to zeteticum
I.1: “Data differentia duorum laterum, & aggregato eurumdem: invenire latera”. To do
this, Vie`te denotes respectively with “B” and “D” the difference and the sum of sides, and
with “A” the smaller side. Let us write “y” instead of “A”, and, to avoid any confusion,
“C” instead of “D”. It follows that






To solve zeteticum II.17, one should then substitute
√
4D−B3







As a matter of fact, Vie`te does not follow this procedure. He stops his solution of
zeteticum II.17 by remarking that, because of the equality (18), if B andD were respectively
6 and 504, the square of the sum of sides would be 100, and he also stops his solution of
zeteticum I.1 by noticing that, because of the equality (20), if B and C were respectively
40 and 100, the sides would be 70 and 30.
Supposing that Vie`te’s zetetica had been interpreted as arithmetical problems, there
would be of course nothing else to do in order to solve the second one, while to solve the first,
one should simply have to make explicit the content of equality (21), and eventually con-
tinue with the numerical example chosen by Vie`te, observing that in this case x and y would
respectively be 8 and 2. But assuming that Vie`te’s zetetica had been interpreted as geomet-
rical problems, a complete solution would have consisted in the geometrical constructions
that equalities (21) and (20) only hint at. Though the first of these constructions is a little
elaborate, both of them are standard constructions to be performed by ruler and compass.
117Vie`te also presents an alternative argument. By denoting the greater side with “x” one gets 2x−B = C




Thus Vie`te seems to have with respect to his zetetica—taken as geometrical problems—the
same attitude that al-Khayya¯m had with respect to his geometrical equation-like problems:
he limits himself to reducing them to other problems that one was already able to solve,
and, as a matter of fact, he does that by means of a trans-configurational analysis.
There is a crucial difference however, between al-Khayya¯m’s and Vie`te’s arguments.
The former had at his disposal a language to be used for expressing the common forms
of both arithmetic and geometrical equation-like problems, and in certain cases, he could
imagine geometrical models for arithmetical problems. But he could not operate directly on
the common forms of his problems to reduce them to other problems. In order to perform
his analysis, he had to interpret his problems either as arithmetical or as geometrical
problems, and rely either on arithmetic or on geometrical non-positional inferences. The
latter could, instead, rely on a repertoire of rules of inference to be applied, together with
appropriate substitutions, to transform the same equalities expressing the common forms
of purely quantitative problems both arithmetical and geometrical into other equalities or
proportions expressing new problems. He could perform his analysis without being forced
to make a preliminary choice of interpretation. Hence, a trans-configurational analysis is
for him neither an arithmetical nor a geometrical procedure, but an abstract one, as it is
concerned with abstract quantities.
It is difficult to overestimate such a novelty. But it seems to me that we would gain
in historical clarity, accuracy, and perspicuity if we were able to see the deep relations
connecting this crucial novelty with an old art which, I suggest, Vie`te was considering
as an ancient form of algebra and which was used, long before him, to conduct trans-
configurational analyses concerned with geometrical problems118.
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historical question that Netz, with his [47], has recently addressed in a new and quite stimulating form).
There is no doubt that the second book of the Elements contains nothing similar to Vie`te’s or Descartes’
formalism. Still a large number of its propositions—as well as many other propositions of the Elements,—are
apt to be used—and, as a matter of fact, were used both in Greek and in the Arabic geometry—as rules of
inferences occurring in trans-configurational analysis.
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